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The hour of liberation is at hand, God willing. But remember
that your near-term goal is confined to freeing your country
from the forces of occupation and their followers, and not to be
preoccupied in settling scores . . . . You must show genuine
forgiveness and put aside revenge over the spilled blood of your
sons and brothers, including the sons of Saddam Hussein.
-Purported letter written by Saddam Hussein,
signed as "President and commander in chief
of the holy warrior armed forces."1
And now the former dictator of Iraq will face the justice he
denied to millions. The capture of this man was crucial to the
rise of a free Iraq. It marks the end of the road for him, and for
all who bullied and killed in his name . . . . There will be no
return to the corrupt power and privilege they once held. For
the vast majority of Iraqi citizens who wish to live as free men
and women, this event brings further assurance that the
torture chambers and the secret police are gone forever. And
this afternoon, I have a message for the Iraqi people: You will
not have to fear the rule of Saddam Hussein ever again. All
Iraqis who take the side of freedom have taken the winning
side. The goals of our coalition are the same as your goals—

*Professor of the Practice of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School.
Saddam Letter Says Iraq’s ‘Liberation’ at Hand; New Slaying Linked to Trial, USA TODAY, Oct.
http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2006-10-16-saddam15,
2006,
available
at
letter_x.htm.
1
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sovereignty for your country, dignity for your great culture,
and for every Iraqi citizen, the opportunity for a better life.
-President George W. Bush, Address to the
Nation, Dec. 14, 20032
I.

INTRODUCTION

Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti died at the hands of Iraqi officials at dawn on
December 30, 2006, following a tumultuous fourteen month trial3 for crimes
committed against the citizens of a relatively obscure Iraqi village known as
al-Dujail.4 Maintaining his façade of disdain when the verdict and sentence
were announced on November 5, 2006, Saddam entered the courtroom with
an arrogant strut and refused to stand until the guards made him do so to
hear the judge’s opinion.5 When Saddam interrupted the reading of the
verdict, Judge Ra’ouf Rasheed Abdel Rahman turned down the volume of his
microphone and spoke over him. Speaking on behalf of the five judge panel,
Judge Ra’ouf sentenced Saddam to “death by hanging” for the crime of
willfully murdering Iraqi citizens from the town of al-Dujail. Saddam railed,
“God curse the enemies of the occupation.” He demanded that the Arab
people “stand up” and proclaimed “death to the enemies of the nation.”6 An
automatic appeal of the verdict was initiated and heard by the nine-judge
Cassation Panel, which issued its opinion on December 26, 2006.7 Saddam’s

The full text of the statement is available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2003/12/20031214-3.html.

2

3 The al-Dujail trial began on October 19, 2005, and the proceedings were completed on July 27,
2006. The verdict was announced on November 5, 2006, although the full trial opinion was not
released until November 22, 2006. The defense submissions for the Cassation Court were
received on December 3, 2006, and were denied on December 26, 2006. Timeline: Saddam
Hussein Dujail Trial, BBC NEWS, Dec. 4, 2006, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/
4507568.stm.

The official summary of Judge Ra’id Juhi’s investigative file, signed by the investigative judge
responsible for developing the Dujail referral file summarizes the incident at Dujail and the
subsequent criminal acts committed against the civilian population of the village. While the acts
of the regime were criminal and excessive, the incident pales alongside other more widespread
regime crimes such as the Anfal campaign. See Judge Ra’id Juhi, Investigative Judge of Iraqi
High Tribunal, Investigative Summary of Dujail Case, available at http://www.iraqiht.org/en/doc/articleofaldujail.pdf. For other descriptions of the process and analysis of its flaws,
both real and perceived, see MARIEKE WIERDA & MIRANDA SISSONS, Int’l Center for Transitional
Just., Dujail: Trail and Error?, (2006), available at http://www.ictj.org/images/content/
5/9/597.pdf; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, JUDGING DUJAIL: THE FIRST TRIAL BEFORE THE IRAQI HIGH
TRIBUNAL (2006), available at http://hrw.org/reports/2006/iraq1106/.
4

5 See John F. Burns & Kirk Semple, Hussein is Sentenced to Death by Hanging, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
6, 2006, at A1.
6

Author’s personal notes of the televised session.

Cassation Panel, Iraqi High Criminal Court, Al-Dujail Final Opinion, available at
http://www.iraq-iht.org/ar/doc/ihtco.pdf. For the unofficial English translation, broken down into
six segments, see http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/20070103_dujail_appellate_
chamber_opinion.pdf. The brevity and timing of the appeals decision has been the subject of

7
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execution was carried out on the first day of the Sunni religious holiday ‘Eid
al-Adha’8 despite a provision of Iraqi law that a death sentence “cannot be
carried out on official holidays and special festivals connected with the
religion of the condemned person.”9 The executioner’s rope tightened around
his neck and interrupted him as he prayed the most sacred Islamic prayer:
“[t]here is no god but Allah . . . .” The sectarian overtones of the poorly
implemented execution were preserved on a grainy video apparently taken
from an illicit cell phone.10 Despite the plea for dignity from a voice on the
video that is heard to say “[p]lease no . . . this man is about to die,” some of
those attending the execution taunted Hussein and gleefully celebrated his
demise.11 The jarring images flashed around the world, lending an eerie air of
dignity to the end of one of the cruelest tyrants of the twentieth century.
Following the trial, Saddam died as a convicted criminal whose crimes
were documented in a 283 page judgment.12 The opinion is a thorough and
organized catalogue of the factual record of evidence from the trial and the
investigative file. The Trial Judgment carefully assesses the elements of each
charged offense, along with the relevant mens rea demonstrated by the
available evidence, and it applies the relevant domestic and international law
to each and every charge against each of the eight defendants in detail.
Although Saddam’s execution does undercut the “expressive value” of the

heavy criticism. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE POISONED CHALICE: A HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH
BRIEFING PAPER ON THE DECISION OF THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL IN THE DUJAIL CASE 32 (2007),
available at http://hrw.org/backgrounder/ij/iraq0607/iraq0607web.pdf (“The speed of the decision,
the brevity of the opinion (17 pages) and the cursory nature of the reasoning make it difficult to
conclude that the Appeals Chamber conducted a genuine review as required by international fair
trial principles.”).
8 See Sabrina Tavernise, For Sunnis, Dictator’s Degrading End Signals Ominous Dawn for the
New Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at A7; Hassan M. Fattah, For Arab Critics, Hussein’s
Execution Symbolizes the Victory of Vengeance over Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2006, at 13.
9 Law on Criminal Proceedings with Amendments, Number 23 of 1971, Decree No. 230 Issued by
the Revolutionary Command Council, Feb. 14, 1971, para. 290 (Iraq), reprinted in UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, IRAQI LAWS REFERENCED IN THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL
TRIBUNAL (2004), available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi_Criminal_
Procedure_Code.pdf [hereinafter Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings].

John F. Burns & Marc Santora, U.S. Questioned Iraq on the Rush to Hang Saddam, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 1, 2007, at A1 (reporting that American authorities predicated transfer of Saddam
into Iraqi custody with the demand that “we need everything to be in accordance with the law . . .
We do not want to break the law.” The Iraqi political officials telephoned officials of the supreme
religious body of Iraqi Shiism, composed of ayatollahs from the holy city of Najaf, who dutifully
approved and sent a signed letter to the Shiite Prime Minister authorizing him “to carry out the
hanging until death”).
10

11

Id.

The unofficial English translation of the
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/dujail/opinion.asp
(References hereinafter are to specific pages of the
publicly available). See also Judgment of Al-Dujail
2, App. A (2006–2007).
12

Trial Chamber opinion is available at
[hereinafter al-Dujail Trial Judgment],
unofficial English language translation made
Law in 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L . J. Nos. 1 &
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subsequent and important trials that remain,13 its legal foundations, factual
findings, and judicial inferences are preserved in the extensive opinion for the
world, and particularly Iraqis, to read and analyze. The grossly sectarian
overtones of the botched execution do not negate the entirety of the publicly
accessible trial sessions, in which the defense presented more than sixty
witnesses and the prosecution introduced more than twenty witnesses
(termed complainants in Iraqi law). The flawed execution is an incomplete
snapshot of the legal process that brought down Saddam. Saddam’s execution
rekindles memories of the confrontational cross-examination of Herman
Goering, whose theatrical performance appeared to make him overshadow
the Chief Prosecutor, Robert H. Jackson, who served as U.S. Solicitor General
and Supreme Court Justice. Just as Goering’s short term triumph is not
today remembered as a metaphor for the entire International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg the botched execution of Saddam does not
encapsulate all that is memorable or important about the first complete trial
held by the Iraqi High Criminal Court.14
The larger legacy of the al-Dujail Trial will develop against the backdrop
of the referral file that is referenced repeatedly in the opinion of Trial
Chamber I. The al-Dujail referral file prepared by the Investigative Judge is
more than eleven hundred pages long but has never been publicly released in
whole, although it was provided in its entirety to the defense team more than
forty-five days prior to trial as required by Iraqi law.15 The al-Dujail trial
represents a significant window into the current practice of states’
implementation of humanitarian norms, and its lessons have larger
reverberations within the corpus of humanitarian law. Because the Iraqi
domestic system is built on a civil law model, the Tribunal also represents the
most modern effort to meld common and civil law principles into a
consolidated domestic system. This melding, in turn, has yielded a number of
important lessons for future trial processes. By extension, the al-Dujail trial
contains important lessons for the broader field of international
humanitarian law. The balance of this piece will consider some of the most
significant implications of the al-Dujail trial. In particular, this piece will
assess the Tribunal’s actions in light of the normative implications after the
establishment of the Tribunal during the post-war occupation of Iraq, the
arguments related to the immunity of Saddam and other leading members of
the Ba’athist party, and the implications for the doctrine of command
responsibility as a basis for individual criminal responsibility.

13

MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 179 (2007).

14

TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 335–36 (1992).

Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Iraqi Special Tribunal, The Official Gazette of the
Republic of Iraq. No. 4006, Rules 2, 40, and 41 (Oct. 18, 2005), available at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_rules_procedure_evidence.pdf [hereinafter
Tribunal Rules of Procedure].
15
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CONTROVERSIAL DIMENSIONS OF THE HIGH CRIMINAL COURT

The precise legacy of the al-Dujail trial remains unknown at the time of
this writing, partly because few outside the region followed the daily Arabic
broadcasts, and partly because its larger aspirations remain unattainable
due to the turmoil inside Iraq and in the larger region. What is clear is that
the public perception of the judicial process as an extension of the politics
outside the courtroom was reinforced dramatically.16 In the short term, this
has meant that the al-Dujail trial has divided Iraqis instead of providing a
rallying point for national reconciliation. The record of the al-Dujail trial is
one of missteps, mistakes, and misstatements. Its processes and political
dimensions were filled with controversy both within and outside of Iraq.
There was very little predictability in this first trial of the Iraqi High
Criminal Court, yet its very audacity was inspiring. Iraqi lawyers and
politicians succeeded in integrating modern substantive norms into the
domestic criminal code of Iraq.17 They privately took pride in emulating those
states that have ratified the Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court by expanding the crimes punishable in domestic courts.18 To
demonstrate tangible progress toward a modern Iraqi state standing
alongside the community of nations, the Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal
Court (commonly termed the Iraqi High Tribunal across the rest of the
world)19 embodied a synergy between domestic procedural law and the
modern tenets of war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide that
16 See, e.g., Riverblog.blogspot.com, Baghdad Burning, A Lynching, Dec. 31, 2006, http://riverbend
blog.blogspot.com (last visited Nov. 1, 2007).

It's official. Maliki and his people are psychopaths. This really is a new low.
It's outrageous—an execution during Eid. Muslims all over the world (with
the exception of Iran) are outraged. Eid is a time of peace, of putting aside
quarrels and anger—at least for the duration of Eid. This does not bode
well for the coming year. No one imagined the madmen would actually do
it during a religious holiday. It is religiously unacceptable and before, it
was constitutionally illegal. We thought we'd at least get a few days of
peace and some time to enjoy the Eid holiday, which coincides with the New
Year this year. We've spent the first two days of a holy holiday watching
bits and pieces of a sordid lynching. America the savior. . . . After nearly
four years and Bush's biggest achievement in Iraq has been a lynching.
Bravo Americans.
Id.
See also Robert Fisk, A Dictator Created Then Destroyed by America, RINF.COM, Dec. 29, 2006,
http://www.rinf.com/columnists/news/a-dictator-created-then-destroyed-by-america.
Compare Al-Waqa’i Al-Ivaqiya [The Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq], Law of the The
Iraqi Higher Criminal Court, Oct. 18, 2005, 4006 No. 10, arts. 11–13
available at
www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/IST_statute_official-english.pdf [hereinafter Statute
of the Iraqi High Criminal Court], and Rome Statute of Int’l Crim. Ct., arts. 6, 7, 8 July 1, 2002,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

17

This observation is based on the author’s extensive discussions with many Iraqi judges,
lawyers, and prosecutors over a period of several years.

18

19

See Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, supra note 17.
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were to be implemented insofar as possible using the underlying foundation
of the Iraqi procedural code. The judges also studied the best practices from
the ad hoc tribunals and strove to follow those examples (such as having a
Defense Office internal to the Tribunal with counsel available on stand-by if
needed).20 The Tribunal Elements of Crimes21 were closely modeled on the
International Criminal Court Elements, and the judges repeatedly used the
Arabic version of the official International Criminal Court Elements22 as the
basis for their probing questions to international advisors regarding the fit
between Iraqi domestic crimes and those recognized under international law.
The statute expressly permitted the Iraqi judges to “resort to the decisions of
international criminal tribunals” when needed to interpret and apply the
provisions punishing genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity as
incorporated into Iraqi law.23 However, the precise linkage between the
international character of the crimes and their domestic counterparts was not
fully explored in the Dujail opinions and remains for development in
subsequent cases.
Iraqi jurists conducted a trial that had moments of chaos interspersed
amongst days of testimony, documentary evidence, and often arcane legal
arguments. They used a transparent process to implement those norms to
hold Ba’athist party officials accountable for crimes committed against their
own citizens. Moreover, the al-Dujail trial was held in the midst of a
burgeoning insurgency that had already claimed the lives of more than 2,200
American military personnel as the trial began.24 The insurgency also made
the logistical coordination required to gather evidence, protect trial
participants, and procure the attendance of witnesses more difficult than for
any other major war crimes trial in history. For each witness who testified to
his or her personal suffering, who looked into the faces of those who had
traumatized Iraqi society, there were a thousand others who could have told
the same stories. The Iraqi people watched, commented, and critiqued every
nuance of the trial process. The free Iraqi press had a field day of

20

Tribunal Rules of Procedure, supra note 15, Rule 30.

Iraqi Special Tribunal, Elements of Crimes, available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/
documents/IST_Elements.pdf.

21

22 See Preparatory Comm’n for the Int’l Crim. Ct., Finalized Draft Text of the Elements of Crimes,
U.N. Doc. PCNICC/2000/1/Add.2 (Nov. 2, 2000) (establishing the “Elements of Crimes” for the
International Criminal Court). Article 9 of the Rome Statute states that the Elements shall
“assist the Court in the interpretation and application” of the provisions related to war crimes,
genocide and crimes against humanity. Rome Statute of Int’l Crim. Ct. supra note 17, at art. 9.
23

Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, supra note 17, at art. 17.

Iraqi Coalition Casualty Count, Cumulative Coalition Fatalities, available at
http://icasualties.org/oif/Cumulative.aspx. Hundreds of thousands of Iraqis have been killed and
wounded by the conflict itself as well as the deliberate targeting by insurgent forces. At the time
of this writing, nearly 300 members of the coalition have lost their lives in Iraq along with an
estimated 70,000 Iraqi civilian, police, and security forces as a result of the ongoing armed
conflict. American military killed and wounded have topped 26,000 in addition to a number of
casualties suffered by civilian contractors. Id.

24
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commentary and conspiratorial analysis. The legal process formed the canvas
against which an explosive mix of personalities, politics, power, and ego
combined to produce the most important trial in the history of the region.
Saddam’s trial was one of the pivotal events in the modern history of the
Middle East, yet its history is muddled in misconception and shrouded with
miscommunication.
Perceptions of the trial and its processes rapidly hardened around
fragments of media reporting and the few moments of video that repeatedly
replayed worldwide. For example, Saddam and ten other potential
defendants appeared one by one before the investigative judge, Judge Ra’id
Juhi, for the first time on July 1, 2004, and many Iraqis watched
breathlessly, hoping for a reassuring sense that an orderly administration of
justice was in place to address the vast range of crimes committed under
Ba’athist rule. Iraqis lived in a climate of pervasive fear during Saddam’s
regime, and to see him alive and humbled before the power of the bench was
an incredibly powerful image. Saddam’s capture in December 2003 had an
electrifying effect among the population. Under the regime, Iraqis thought of
Saddam with a mixture of dread and paralyzing fear, intermingled with
pockets of latent nationalist pride. His personal image was one of grandiose
narcissism that led him to insert himself into almost every facet of Iraqi
life.25 Describing the dim hopes for a future of freedom, one Marsh Arab on
the outskirts of Nassiriyah said that “when Saddam was in office, we used to
be afraid of the walls.”26 While the insurgency could have been fed by images
of a defiant and dignified Saddam being treated with cruelty by so called
“imperialist occupiers” as he was captured, the ex-dictator’s meekness and
powerless confusion inspired no nationalist fervor across Iraq or in the
broader Arab world. Psychologists observed that the images of a broken man
emerging from a “spider hole” in the ground beneath a mud hut in abject
submission reinforced Saddam’s submissive role.27 No one will ever know
with certainty, but it is likely that the strategy of disrupting the trial and
denying its legitimacy originated at the time that Saddam was humiliated
before the cameras of the world and was subsequently fed by his delusional
narcissism.
The initial confrontation between Judge Ra’id in the service of the law
and Saddam clinging to the vestiges of absolute authority was one of high
drama. Many commentators incorrectly characterized the session as an
“arraignment” akin to those common in American courtrooms, although such
Jerrold M. Post & Lara K. Panis, Tyranny on Trial: Personality and the Courtroom Conduct of
Defendants Slobodan Milosevic and Saddam Hussein, 38 CORNELL INT’L L. J. 823, 834 (2005).

25

INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND THE HUM. RTS. CTR. OF THE U. OF CAL., BERKELEY,
IRAQI VOICES: ATTITUDES TOWARD TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL RECONSTRUCTION (2004)
(capturing the results of interviews taken from a broad cross section of the Iraqi population by a
team of researchers conducted in July and August 2003).
26

Jerrold M. Post, Rathole under the Palace: Grandiosity and Defiance Cloaked the Pain and
Fear Bred in Hussein, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 21, 2003, at M1.

27
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a process would have been a foreign practice grafted onto Iraqi practice.28
Neither Saddam nor any other defendant formally had been charged with
anything, and the construction of the courthouse was ongoing.29 In fact, the
sole purpose of that first hearing before Judge Ra’id was to provide the legal
justification for detaining Saddam and the other potential defendants as
investigations proceeded following the return of full Iraqi sovereignty.30
Saddam immediately challenged the sense of orderly process and set the tone
that would permeate the entire trial until the moment of his execution nearly
thirty months later. He demanded to know “how can you charge me with
anything without protecting my rights under the constitution?”31
The High Criminal Court Rules of Procedure stipulate that the
investigating judge must notify all suspects of their rights during their first
appearance for questioning.32 In accordance with Iraqi procedural law, any
Saddam’s Arraignment, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, July 1, 2004, http://frum.national
review.com/post/?q=MjQyOThiOWU5ZGY0MTg4ZGIyYmI3NGI3YWIwZDMzZmI.

28

For an edited text of the first session before Judge Ra’id Juhi, the chief Investigative Judge of
the Tribunal, see http://www.counterpunch.org/saddam07022004.html.

29

Aside from questions regarding the incident in al-Dujail and its bloody aftermath, the focus of
the early investigative hearing was on a range of other alleged crimes, such as the invasion of
Kuwait, the brutal suppression of the 1991 uprising, and the gassing of the village of Halabja.
For a description of the proceedings, see John F. Burns, The Reach of War: The Defendant;
Defiant Hussein Rebukes Iraqi Court for Trying Him, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2004, at A1. The initial
hearing before an investigative judge is required by Iraqi law as a predicate for holding the
potential defendant in custody. Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 9, at para.
123.
30

[T]he examining magistrate or investigator must question the accused within
24 hours of his attendance, after proving his identity and informing him of
the offence of which he is accused. His statements on this should be recorded,
with a statement of evidence in his favour. The accused should be questioned
again if necessary to establish the truth.
Id.
Rupert Cornwell, Saddam in the Dock: Listen to His Victims, Not Saddam, Says White House,
THE INDEP., July 2, 2004 (reporting that Hussein stated, “this is all theatre,” at his first pre-trial
hearing), available at http://news.independent.co.uk/world/americas/story.jsp?story=537296. For
those who have observed the Milosevic trial, Saddam’s statements were eerily familiar. During
his initial appearance before the ICTY on July 3, 2001, Milosevic challenged the legality of the
establishment of the ICTY. In a pre-trial motion, Milosevic stated, “I challenge the very legality
of this court because it is not established in the basis of law.” Milosevic Challenges the Legality of
NEWSHOUR,
Feb.
13,
2002,
available
at
the
U.N.
Tribunal,
ONLINE
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/february02/milosevic _2-13.html.
31

32

Tribunal Rules of Procedure, supra note 15, at Rule 27. Rule 27 reads as follows:
Rights of the Suspect during Questioning by an Investigative Judge
First: A suspect who is questioned by an Investigative Judge shall have the
following rights of which he must be informed by the Investigative Judge
prior to questioning in a language he speaks and understands:
A. The right to legal assistance of his own choosing, including the right to
have legal assistance provided by the Defence Office if he does not have
sufficient means to pay for it;
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statement made by the accused to the investigating judge is recorded in the
written record and “signed by the accused and the magistrate or
investigator.”33 Thus, every suspect (including Saddam) who has appeared
before the investigative judges to date has been notified of their rights to
counsel and has acknowledged their comprehension of those rights in
writing.34 Subsequent appearances before the investigative judge are
undertaken only in the presence of the defense counsel.35 Numerous facts
from the investigative record emerged as important evidence in the Dujail
trial; for example the fact that the “assassination” attempt had been nothing
more than ten to twelve shots fired from some distance away as Saddam’s
convoy traveled through al-Dujail.36 Outside the judicial process, lawyers

B. The right to free interpreting assistance of if he cannot understand or
speak the language used in questioning;
C. The right to remain silent. In this regard, the suspect or accused must be
cautioned that any statement he makes may be used against him in court.
Second: An accused may voluntarily waive his right to legal assistance during
questioning if the Investigative Judge determines that the waiver is
voluntarily and knowingly made.
Third: If an accused has exercised his right to legal assistance, questioning by
an Investigative Judge may not be performed without the presence of counsel
if the accused did not . . . his right, willingly and knowingly for the presence
of his counsel. In a case of the waiver, if the accused later expressed his will
to have legal assistance, accordingly the questioning must stop accordingly
and must not resume except with the presence of counsel.
Id.
33

Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 9, at para. 128.

34

Copies of the statements from that July 2004 hearing are on file with the author.

35

Id. For example, in that first session, this was one of the exchanges that took place:
SADDAM: I speak for myself.
JUDGE: Yes, as a citizen you have the right. But the guarantees you have to
sign because these were read to you, recited to you.
SADDAM: Anyway, why are you worried? I will come again before you with
the presence of the lawyers, and you will be giving me all of these documents
again. So why should we rush any action now and make mistakes because of
rushed and hasty decisions or actions?
JUDGE: No, this is not a hasty decision-making now. I'm just investigating.
And we need to conclude and seal the minutes.
SADDAM: No, I will sign when the lawyers are present.
JUDGE: Then you can leave.

CounterPunch Wire, What Law Formed This Court?: Transcript of Saddam’s Arraignment,
COUNTERPUNCH, Jul. 2, 2002, http://www.counterpunch.org/saddam07022004.html.
36 See Al Dujail Lawsuit, Case No. 1/9 First/2005, English Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber
Opinion, Part I, 9 (2006), available at http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/
dujail_opinion_pt1.pdf [hereinafter Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber
Opinion].

40
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hired by Hussein’s wife sought to undermine the orderliness of the
proceedings and to create a perception of lawless irregularity by publicly
claiming that the Tribunal could not lawfully impose any punishments
because it lacked legitimacy or lawful creation.37
From those first dramatic moments in July 2004, the tension between law
and power and between truth and tyranny was a constant undercurrent in
the al-Dujail trial; it was almost palpable to trial observers inside the
courtroom as the days passed.38 In its Judgment, the Trial Chamber
describes the conduct of the defendants and their lawyers as “anarchist” and
an “organized offensive course” intended to provoke the court.39 Iraqi law
provides that the Trial Chamber “is not permitted, in its ruling, to rely upon
a piece of evidence which has not been brought up for discussion or referred
to during the hearing, nor is it permitted to rely on a piece of paper given to it
by a litigant without the rest of the litigants seeing it.”40 Despite the
frequency of outbursts and disruptive conduct, the Trial Chamber expressly
noted that it strove to demonstrate “magnanimity” and “tolerance . . . for the
purpose of serving . . . justice,” and hence “disregarded all these fabrications
and violations” by basing its decision on the evidentiary record.41 Quite apart
from the process inside the courtroom, the revitalized free press in the
country had a field day throughout the trial. The barrage of media criticism
amidst the chorus of commentary from all across the political spectrum led to
the resignation of the original Presiding Judge, Rizgar Amin.42 Moreover,
eight persons associated with the process were murdered during the course of
the trial, further creating the perception of disorder and unfairness. Rather
than succumbing to the manipulation of the murderers, the judges expressed
their sympathy, granted defense requests for delays, ensured that procedures
were in place to preserve the defendants’ rights to the assistance of counsel,
scrutinized security precautions for trial participants, and forged ahead.43
Despite the interruptions, there was no stage of the al-Dujail trial in which

Rory McCarthy & Jonathan Steele, Saddam on Trial: Legitimacy and Neutrality of Court Will
Be Challenged, THE GUARDIAN, July 2, 2004, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/Iraq
/Story/0,2763,1252096,00.html.

37

38

Interview with RCLO official (Dec. 13, 2006).

39

Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 24.

40

Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 9, at para. 212.

41

Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 24.

See Robert F. Worth, Fed Up, Judge in Hussein Trial Offers to Quit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2006,
at A6 (reporting Judge Rizgar’s frustration that the Tribunal officials took no public action to
defend his actions or judicial integrity).

42

The Trial Chamber opinion describes many of the specific measures taken to preserve the
defendants’ rights to a fair trial and those measures taken to safeguard members of the defense
team to include secure transportation and living arrangements upon request. Part I, Unofficial
Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 24–27.

43

Winter 2008]

RETROSPECTIVE ON THE AL-DUJAIL TRIAL

41

any defendant was unrepresented by either his attorneys or those provided
by the Court when the retained counsel boycotted proceedings.44
The judges intended many of their decisions to increase the perceptions of
fairness and demonstrate the rebirth of an effective Iraqi judiciary committed
to finding the truth while adhering to the defendants’ rights.45 Instead, this
seemed to catalyze the cynicism of the population and feed popular
misconceptions that the trial was a form of American power. The Coalition
Provisional Authority Order that delegated authority to the Iraqi leaders to
promulgate the Statute required that the Tribunal meet “international
standards of justice.”46 Under the terms of the Statute, the Trial Chambers
must “ensure that a trial is fair and expeditious and that proceedings are
conducted in accordance with this Statute and the rules of procedure and
evidence, with full respect for the rights of the accused and due regard for the
protection of victims and witnesses.”47 Articles 19 and 20 of the Tribunal
Statute set out a range of fundamental rights, styled as “Guaranties” for the
defendants that the judges must ensure are implemented.48 For example,
based on these mandates and the requirements of Iraqi law, after a witness
has testified and answered any questions from the bench necessary to clarify
the facts, the “prosecutor, complainant, civilian plaintiff, a civil official, and
the defendant may discuss the testimony via the court and ask questions and
request clarifications to establish the facts.”49 In accordance with the
procedural law, the judges permitted Saddam and other defendants to
question witnesses and to participate in exploring the defense perspectives on
the testimony. Despite the fact that the judges anticipated such outbursts
and handled them in a similar manner to the ad hoc international tribunals,
the Dujail defendants’ lawful right to raise issues in their own defense
became the sword that Saddam and other defendants used to conduct the
rants and outbursts that became fixed in the public perception as the norm
during court sessions.50 The press widely reported these outbursts. There
were times when the insurgency raging outside the courtroom seemed
directly linked and fed by the events inside the courtroom. Saddam and other
44

Id. at 2; CounterPunch Wire, supra note 35.

MICHAEL P. SCHARF & GREGORY S. MCNEAL, SADDAM OF TRIAL: UNDERSTANDING AND
DEBATING THE IRAQI HIGH TRIBUNAL 119 (2006).
45

46 See Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 48: Delegation of Authority Regarding an
Iraqi
Special
Tribunal
(Dec.
10,
2003),
available
at
http://www.cpairaq.org/regulations/20031210_CPAORD_48_IST_and_Appendix_A.pdf.
47 Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, supra note 17, at art. 20, § 2. The phrase “rules of
procedure” includes those contained in the underlying Iraqi Law No. 23 of 1971. Id. at art. 16.

The Arabic word literally means “guarantees,” but the intended meaning is “rights.” The
official translation uses the phrase “Guaranties of the Accused” as the heading for Article 19 of
the Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court. See id. at art 19.

48

49

Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 9, at para. 168.

See Michael P. Scharf, Chaos in the Courtroom: Controlling Disruptive Defendants and
Contumacious Counsel in War Crimes Trials, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L 145 (2006).
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defendants managed to fan the flames of conflict from within the walls of the
trial on a number of occasions. During one such occasion, Saddam shouted,
“Down with the Americans! Down with the traitors,”51 which in turn
prompted the defense attorneys to start yelling, resulting in what the
Judgment describes as “him being taken away from the hall in accordance
with the provision of article [158] of the penal regulations law.”52
Saddam retained an animal magnetism that competed with the judicial
power from the first moments of trial down to its dramatic conclusion as the
dominating force in the courtroom. The shouted exhortations, extraneous
arguments, and demonstrations of defiance to the judges (such as Barzan alTikriti wearing pajamas to court or defendants repeatedly turning their
backs to the judges) became flashpoints of controversy. The hours of orderly
testimony and the trauma endured by the civilians of al-Dujail went largely
ignored. No western media outlet ever showed Saddam or any other
defendant apologizing to the bench, despite the fact that they did so more
than a dozen times during the course of the trial.53 However, the problems
faced by the Iraqi judges were identical to those presented by other
defendants in international ad hoc tribunals whose conduct has been far
more disruptive and defiant. Like the Iraqi bench, international judges
repeatedly have been forced to remove disruptive defendants from the
courtroom in the interests of decorum and the judicial process, and have
appointed standby counsel to preserve the rights of defendants who have
chosen to undermine the truth-seeking processes inherent in a fair trial.54
During the Dujail trial, standby counsel served to protect the rights of the
defendant in “interests of justice” and helped preserve the Tribunal’s
“legitimate interest in ensuring that the trial proceeds in a timely manner
without interruptions, adjournments or disruptions.”55 Like their colleagues
51

Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 25.

Iraqi Law No. 23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 9, at para. 158 (“The defendant may not
be removed from the court room during consideration of the case unless he violates the rules of
the court, in which case procedures continue as if he were present. The court must keep him
informed of the procedures which took place in his absence.” According to the Trial Chamber, the
defense team also spread the names of court appointed attorneys to internet web sites in
defiance of the orders from the bench.).
52

Based on the author’s notes during the al-Dujail trial, as well as numerous print reports from
the region during the trial.

53

54 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT, Decision on Prosecution’s Motion for
Order Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defense (Mar. 1, 2005); Prosecutor v.
Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT (Aug. 21, 2006); Order Concerning Appointment of Standby
Counsel and Delayed Commencement of Trial, Decision on Assignment of Counsel; Prosecutor v.
Seselj, Case No. IT-03-67-PT (Oct. 25, 2006); David Hooper, Serbian War Crimes Suspect Seselj
Removed From Hague Hearing, BBC MONITORING NEWSFILE, Nov. 1, 2006, at 1.

Prosecutor v. Seselj, Case No. IT-03-63-PT, Decision on the Prosecution’s Motion for Order
Appointing Counsel to Assist Vojislav Seselj with his Defense (May 9, 2003) (holding that Article
21 of the ICTY Statute does not on its face exclude the possibility of offering an accused the
assistance of assigned counsel where “the interests of justice so require. The need may arise for
unforeseeable reasons to protect an accused's interests and to ensure a fair and expeditious
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in international processes, the Iraqi judges would respond to repeated
demonstrations of defiance and rambling diatribes by occasionally blocking
the audio and video broadcasts. They also handled the repetitive hunger
strikes precisely in accordance with international standards.56 Lastly, while
the Tribunal Statute permits the presiding judge to close proceedings under
extremely limited circumstances, that power was used quite sparingly.57
When defendants were removed from court, they had full access to their
attorneys and watched a closed circuit broadcast of the proceedings from
their cells, and they were able to consult with their counsel during trial
sessions. No defendant or defense attorney was ever denied admission to the
courtroom when they acceded to the authority of the presiding judge.
Despite the range of protections afforded defendants and the judges’
efforts to maintain the focus on the presentation and evaluation of the actual
evidence during the trial, the “speechifying” and political diatribe ultimately
caused many Iraqis to conclude that a “far more suitable outcome would have
been to . . . hold the trials outside Iraq even if a capital sentence could not
have been passed.”58 Moreover, the taint of political interference continues to
linger over the proceedings, which implicates the very essence of an
independent and impartial system of justice at the very foundation of
fairness. At this early date, it appears that the Iraqi High Criminal Court has
fallen short of its aspiration to serve as a rallying point of unity and pride for
the Iraqi people as it addresses the crimes of its past. The al-Dujail opinion
nevertheless serves as an important benchmark for the future development of
international humanitarian law. Its formation during a period of occupation
and the clear findings of the court vis-a-vis the balance between domestic law
and the orders of the occupying powers demonstrate its importance. The
treatment of the sovereign immunity defenses raised is also notable. This
paper concludes by assessing the Judgment and Cassation Panel decision
(the Appeals verdict rendered on December 26, 2006) in light of the theories
of personal responsibility articulated by the judges.

trial”). The need for a strong Defense Office and the availability of standby counsel familiar with
the entire trial is one of the most enduring lessons of the al-Dujail Trial. See Michael Scharf,
Lessons from the Saddam Trial, 39 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L., NOS. 1 & 2, 1 (2006–07) (generated
from the Oct. 7, 2006 Cleveland Experts Meeting). Because the Iraqi domestic system is built on
a civil law model, the Tribunal represents the most modern effort to meld common and civil law
principles into a consolidated system and has accordingly yielded a number of important lessons
for future trial processes).
See Nevmerzhehitsky v. Ukraine, App. No. 54825/00, Eur. Comm’n H.R. Decid. Rep. (2005),
para. 94; Mara Silver, Testing Cruzan: Prisoners and the Constitutional Question of SelfStarvation, 58-2 STAN. L. REV. 631, 633–34 (2005) (Giving into a prisoner’s demands never, in
any legal system across the globe, has been put forth openly as a legitimate judicial solution to
ending that prisoner’s hunger strike.); Joel K. Greenberg, Hunger Striking Prisoners: The
Constitutionality of Force-Feeding, 51 FORDHAM L. REV. 747 (1983).
56

57

Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, supra note 17, at art. 20.

DR. ALI ALLAWI, THE OCCUPATION OF IRAQ: WINNING THE WAR AND LOSING THE PEACE 434–35
(2007).
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TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE UNDER THE LAW OF OCCUPATION

The procedural and substantive components of the Iraqi High Criminal
Court functioned in the shadow cast by its inception during the Coalition
occupation. The very antithesis of a judicial process based on legal arguments
and evidence is one in which the courtroom simply serves as the stage upon
which judges serve as proxies for the political desires of their masters. The
relationship of a subjugated civilian population to a foreign power
temporarily exercising de facto sovereignty is regulated by the extensive
development of the law of occupation.59 In terms of legal rights and duties,
Iraq was considered an occupied territory when it was “actually placed under
the authority of the hostile army.”60 This legal criterion is fulfilled when the
following circumstances prevail on the ground: first, that the existing
government structures have been rendered incapable of exercising their
normal authority; and second, that the occupying power is in a position to
carry out the normal functions of government over the affected area.61 For the
purposes of U. S. policy, occupation is the legal state occasioned by “invasion
plus taking firm possession of enemy territory for the purpose of holding it.”62
Although a state of occupation does not “affect the legal status of the territory
in question,”63 the assumption of authority over the occupied territory
implicitly means that the existing institutions of society have been swept
aside. In the context of the post-war occupation in Iraq, the emotionalism
attached to any implication that the victorious coalition would simply
mandate punishment of its political enemies was heightened as a result of
the political controversy around the world regarding the legality of the
coalition military operations. Indeed, some scholars argued that the
perceptions of hegemonic external power could negate the conceptual benefits
of holding trials in Iraq, such as the availability of victims and evidence.64

59 See Annex to the 1907 Hague Convention IV, Regulations Respective the Laws and Customs of
War on Land, Jan. 26, 1910, reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE LAWS OF WAR 73 (A. Roberts & R.
Guetff eds., Oxford University Press 3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 1907 Hague Regulations]; Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, arts. 47–48, Oct. 21,
1950, 6 U.S.T.3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention].

1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 59, at art. 42; DEP’T OF THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND
WARFARE, DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY FIELD MANUAL 27-10, ¶ 351 (1955) [hereinafter U.S. ARMY
FIELD MANUAL]. The entire Chapter 6 of the U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL relating to the law of
armed conflict is devoted to explaining the test of the law on occupation and U.S. occupation
policy. Id.
60

61

U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 275, ¶ 11.3 (2004).

62

U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 352.

Protocol Addition to the Geneva Convention of August 12, 1949 Relating to the Protection of
Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 4, U.N. DOC. A 32/144 (Dec. 7, 1978)
[hereinafter Protocol I].
63

64 Jose Alvarez, Trying Hussein: Between Hubris and Hegemony, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 319, 326
(2004).
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The baseline principle of occupation law is that the civilian population
should continue to live their lives as normally as possible. This concept may
be termed the “minimalist principle,” though some observers have termed it
the “principle of normality.”65 In accordance with the baseline principle of
normality, Article 43 of the 1907 Hague Regulations stipulates that the
occupying power must respect, “unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force
in the country.”66 In its temporary exercise of functional sovereignty over the
occupied territory, and as a pragmatic necessity, the occupation authority
must ensure the proper functioning of domestic criminal processes and
cannot abdicate that responsibility to domestic officials of the civilian
population who may or may not be willing or able to carry out their normal
functions in pursuit of public order.67 As a policy priority, domestic officials
should enforce domestic law insofar as possible. In addition, crimes not of a
military nature that do not affect the occupant’s security should be delegated
to the jurisdiction of local courts.68 Pursuant to its temporary assumption of
domestic authority, the occupier may detain civilians when there are “serious
and legitimate reasons” to believe that the detained persons threaten the
safety and security of the occupying power.69 The coercive authority of the
occupying power is limited by a specific prohibition against making any
changes to the governmental structure or institutions that would undermine
the benefits guaranteed to civilians under the Geneva Conventions.70
Because the foreign power has displaced the normal domestic offices, the
cornerstone of the law of occupation is the broad obligation that the foreign
power must “take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far
as possible, public order and safety.”71 In the authoritative French, the
occupier must preserve “l’ordre et la vie publics” (i.e., public order and life).72
65

J.S. Pictet, The Principles of International Humanitarian Law, ICRC, Geneva, 1967, at 50.

66

1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 59, at art. 43.

Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 59, at art. 54 (“The Occupying Power may not alter the
status of public officials or judges in the occupied territories, or in any way apply sanctions to or
take any measures of coercion or discrimination against them, should they abstain from fulfilling
their functions for reasons of conscience.”).

67

68

U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 370.

Prosecutor v. Delalic, Mucic, Delic, and Landzo (Celibici), Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgment,
(Feb. 20, 2001).

69

70

Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 59, at art. 47.

71

1907 Hague Regulations, supra note 59, at art. 43 (emphasis added).

Id. The conceptual limitations of foreign occupation also warranted a temporal limitation built
into the 1949 Geneva Conventions that the general application of the law of occupation “shall
cease one year after the general close of military operations.” Fourth Geneva Convention, supra
note 59, at art. 6. Based on pure pragmatism, Article 6 of the Fourth Geneva Convention does
permit the application of a broader range of specific treaty provisions “for the duration of the
occupation, to the extent that such Power exercises the functions of government in such
territory.” Id. The 1977 Protocols eliminated the patchwork approach to treaty protections with
the simple declaration that “the application of the Conventions and of this Protocol shall cease,
in the territory of Parties to the conflict, on the general close of military operations and, in the
72
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On that legal reasoning alone, the establishment of the Iraqi Tribunal might
have been warranted as a matter of legal logic under the inherent occupation
authority of the Coalition if it had been an integral aspect of a larger
strategic plan for restoring public calm and peaceful stability to the civilian
population.
The circumstances surrounding the formulation of the High Criminal
Court are at once the most potent legal and political hurdle to its long-term
reputation. In fact, arguments over the legality of the Tribunal’s formation
caused the first of what would be many defense protests during the long trial.
During the third trial session on December 5, 2005, ex-Qatari Justice
Minister Najib al-Nu’aymi asked to speak regarding the legitimacy of the
tribunal and its formation.73 When Judge Rizgar resisted hearing such an
oral motion in lieu of written submissions, the defense lawyers threatened to
stage an en masse walkout. Judge Rizgar responded that he would appoint
standby counsel to represent the rights of the defendants if the retained
counsel walked out of the courtroom. Although international practice clearly
warrants the appointment of counsel when necessary to preserve the dignity
of the courtroom and protect the rights of the defendants,74 Saddam and his
brother-in-law Barzan al-Tikriti began to shout, “This is a law made by
America and does not reflect Iraqi sovereignty.” After the defense lawyers
left, Saddam, shaking his right hand, told the judge, “You are imposing
lawyers on us. They are imposed lawyers. The court is imposed by itself. We
reject that.”75 Following a ninety-minute defense walk out, al-Nu’aymi read
aloud from the Geneva Conventions and argued that the case could not
proceed because it had been established during a period of occupation that
resulted from an illegal invasion and was not the product of a “legitimate”
Iraqi government.76 The defense team representing Awad Hamad al Bandar
then followed up the courtroom theatrics with a written motion submitted on
December 21, 2005, challenging the legality of the tribunal based on its
creation during a period of coalition occupation rather than at the hands of a
sovereign Iraqi government.
case of occupied territories, on the termination of the occupation.” Protocol I, supra note 63, at
art. 3(b).
Unless otherwise noted, factual details in this paragraph are recorded in the author’s personal
notes.
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Graham Zellick, The Criminal Trial and the Disruptive Defendant: Part Two, 43 MOD. L. REV.
3, 284, 295 (1980); Michael Scharf, Self Representation Versus Assignment of Defense Counsel
Before International Criminal Tribunals, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 1, 31, 35 (2006). See also Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975) (holding that “the right of self-representation is not a
license to abuse the dignity of the courtroom” and “the trial judge may terminate selfrepresentation by a defendant who deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist
misconduct”).
74

75 Saddam Says He’s Not Afraid of Execution, JERUSALEM POST, Dec. 5, 2005, available at
http://www.jpost.com/servlet/Satellite?cid=1132475686374&pagename=JPost%2FJPArticle%2FS
howFull.
76

Author’s personal notes of trial testimony.
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Essential to the promulgation of the original Tribunal Statute in
December 2003, the entity named the “Coalition Provisional Authority”
(CPA) had affirmative authority as the “temporary governing body
designated by the United Nations as the lawful government of Iraq until such
a time as Iraq is politically and socially stable enough to assume its
sovereignty.”77 The United Nations Security Council unanimously affirmed
“the specific authorities, responsibilities, and obligations under applicable
international law of these States of the Coalition as occupying powers under
unified command (the Authority).”78 The CPA posited its power as the
occupation authority in Iraq in declarative terms: “The CPA is vested with all
executive, legislative, and judicial authority necessary to achieve its
objectives, to be exercised under relevant U.N. Security Council resolutions,
including Resolution 1483, and the laws and usages of war.”79 The “Coalition
Provisional Authority” literally was titled: 1) it represented the two States
legally occupying Iraq (the United States and the United Kingdom) as well as
the coalition of more than twenty other States referred to in Resolution 1483
as working “under the Authority”; 2) it was intended to be a temporary power
to bridge the gap to a full restoration of Iraqi sovereign authority;80 and,
perhaps most importantly, 3) it exercised the obligations incumbent on those
States occupying Iraq in the legal sense, and conversely enjoyed the legal
authority flowing from the laws and customs of war. This understanding of
CPA status comports with the diplomatic representations made at the time of
its formation.81
The allegations of so-called “victor’s justice” have haunted virtually every
accountability process since Nuremberg,82 and thus have a visceral power

77

The Coalition Provisional Authority: Overview, http://www.iraqcoalition.org/bremerbio.html.

S.C. Res. 1483, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003) (referring to the members of the
coalition).
78

79 Coalition Provisional Authority Regulation 1, CPA/REG/01 (May 16, 2003), available at
http://www.cpairaq.org/regulations/20030516_CPAREG_1_The_Coalition_Provisional_Authority_.pdf.
80 S.C. Res. 1546, U.N. Doc. 5/Res/1546 (June 8, 2004). Security Council Resolution 1546 was
unanimously passed on June 8, 2004, and welcomed the restoration of full Iraqi sovereignty
effective June 30, 2004. Id.

See Letter from the Permanent Representatives of the United Kingdom and the United States
to the United Nations, addressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc S/2003/538,
(May 8, 2003), available at http://www.globalpolicy.org/security/issues/iraq/document/2003/
0608usukletter.htm (last visited Apr. 15, 2005).

81

Richard May & Marieka Wierda, Trends in International Criminal Evidence: Nuremberg,
Tokyo, The Hague, and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 725, 764 (1999). The perception of
victor’s justice was also a strong motivating factor in the movement to establish a permanent
international criminal court. See, e.g., M. Cherif Bassiouni, The Time Has Come for an
International Criminal Court, 1 IND. INT’L & COMP L. REV. 1, 34 (1991).

82

We cannot rely on the sporadic episodes of the victorious prosecuting the
defeated and then dismantle these ad hoc structures as we did with the
Nuremberg and Tokyo tribunals. The permanency of an international
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that could corrode every facet of the trial. If the truth-seeking process of
trials is overcome by externally imposed limits on judicial independence or
politically motivated revenge, the entire process would suffer from a crisis of
legitimacy. On the other hand, the mere fact that formation of a new judicial
process was predicated on political power does not inherently constitute fatal
bias. Summarizing the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, one
preeminent international jurist opined that “despite certain shortcomings of
due process rules at Nuremberg . . . . Nuremberg was neither arbitrary nor
unjust . . . . [V]ictors sat in judgment and did not corrupt the essential
fairness of the proceedings.”83 The Iraqi High Criminal Court and the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) share the
same jurisprudential underpinnings because the U.N. Security Council
established the ICTY with a ground-breaking 1993 resolution84 premised on
the legal authority of the Security Council to “maintain or restore
international peace and security.”85 Both Tribunals were, therefore, implicitly
founded on the assessment by the officials charged with preserving stability
and the rule of law that prosecution of selected persons responsible for
serious violations of international humanitarian law would facilitate the
restoration of peace and stability. After the first defendant, a Serb named
Dusko Tadic, challenged the legality of the ICTY, the Trial Chamber ruled
that the authority of the Security Council to create the tribunal was
dispositive.86 Just as the Security Council has the “primary responsibility” for
maintaining international peace and security,87 the CPA had a concrete legal
duty to facilitate the return of stability and order to Iraq after the fall of the
regime.
Security Council Resolution 1483 was passed unanimously on May 22,
2003. It called upon the members of the CPA to “comply fully with their
criminal tribunal acting impartially and fairly irrespective of whom the
accused may be is the best policy for the advancement of the international
rule of law and for the prevention and control of international and
transnational criminality.
Id.
83

THEODOR MERON, WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF AGE—ESSAYS 198 (1998).

84

S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/RES/827 (May 25, 1993).

U.N. Charter art. 39 (giving the Security Council the power to “determine the existence of any
threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and it “shall make
recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42,
to maintain or restore international peace and security”).

85

“This International Tribunal is not a constitutional court set up to scrutinize the actions of
organs of the United Nations. It is, on the contrary, a criminal tribunal with clearly defined
powers, involving a quite specific and limited criminal jurisdiction. If it is to confine its
adjudications to those specific limits, it will have no authority to investigate the legality of its
creation by the Security Council.” Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1, Decision on the Defence
Motion on Jurisdiction (Aug. 10, 1995), available at http://www.un.org/icty/tadic/trialc2/decisione/100895.htm.

86

87

U.N. Charter art. 24, at para. 1.
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obligations under international law including in particular the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 and the Hague Regulations of 1907.”88 Resolution 1483
is particularly noteworthy because the Dujail Judgment cites it as conveying
the imprimatur of unanimous Security Council authority to the Iraqi High
Criminal Court by highlighting the need for an accountability mechanism
“for crimes and atrocities committed by the previous Iraqi regime.”89 The
Security Council further required the CPA to exercise its temporary power
over Iraq in a manner “consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and
other relevant international law, to promote the welfare of the Iraqi people
through the effective administration of the territory.”90 Though strikingly
similar to the declaration of Allied power in occupied Germany after World
War II,91 CPA Regulation 1 was founded on bedrock legal authority flowing
from the Chapter VII power of the Security Council as supplemented by the
preexisting power granted to the CPA under the law of occupation.92
Responding to the defense motion challenging the legitimacy of the High
Criminal Court, the Dujail Judgment strikes something of an indignant tone.
The judges were apparently offended by the defense’s constant insinuation
that they were “propelled by others” as a result of the occupation and wrote
that the defense allegations constituted “degrading statements” that
amounted to an “indecent attack” on their character.93 The Iraqi Judicial Law
specifies that the judge shall be bound to “preserve the dignity of the
judicature and to avoid anything that arouses suspicion on his honesty.”94

88

S.C. Res. 1483, ¶ 5, S/RES/1483 (May 22, 2003).

89

Id.

90

Id. ¶ 4.

General Eisenhower’s Proclamation said: “Supreme legislative, judicial, and executive
authority and powers within the occupied territory are vested in me as Supreme Commander of
the Allied Forces and as Military Governor, and the Military Government is established to
exercise these powers.” Reprinted in Military Government Gazette, Germany, United States
Zone, Office of Military Government for Germany, 1 Issue A (June 1, 1946) (copy on file with
author).

91

The Fourth Geneva Convention recognizes the importance of individual rights enjoyed by the
civilian population and the correlative duties of the occupier to that population. The structure of
the Fourth Convention focused on the duties that an occupying power has towards the individual
civilians and the overall societal structure rather than on the relations between the victorious
sovereign and the defeated government. Under the rejected concept termed “debellatio,” the
enemy was defeated utterly and, accordingly, the defeated State forfeited its legal personality
and was absorbed into the sovereignty of the occupier. MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF
LAND WARFARE 600–01 (1959). The successful negotiation of the Geneva Conventions in the
aftermath of World War II marked the definitive rejection of the concept of debellatio, under
which the occupier assumed full sovereignty over the civilians in the occupied territory. EYAL
BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 92 (1993). Debellatio “refers to a situation
in which a party to a conflict has been totally defeated in war, its national institutions have
disintegrated, and none of its allies continue militarily to challenge the enemy on its behalf.” Id.
92

93

Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 24.

Law of Judicial Organization, Number 160 of 1979, Resolution No. 1724, issued by the
Revolutionary Command Council, Oct. 12, 1979, art. 7, published by the Ministry of Justice,
94
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Careful trial observers noted that the Dujail judges were very conscious of
the gravity of their task in seeking the truth about the events surrounding alDujail.95 On the very first day of trial, Judge Rizgar Amin reminded all of the
defendants of their fair trial rights as embedded in the Statute and in Iraqi
law, and pointedly reminded them of the presumption of innocence.96 Judge
Ra’ouf frequently reminded the defendants of the constitutional principle
(also found in the Statute of the Tribunal97 and in the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights98) that an accused is “innocent until he is proven
guilty in a legal trial.”99 Citing the series of Security Council Resolutions that
began with Resolution 1483, the Trial Chamber flatly rejected the defense
motion based on the “self evident” truth that the Iraqi government retained
the right to prosecute Ba’athist officials for “the crimes determined and
adopted in international criminal law.”100 Resolution 1483 operated in
conjunction with the residual laws and customs of war to establish positive
legal authority for the formation of the Iraqi High Criminal Court under CPA
authority as delegated to the Interim Governing Council.
The Trial Chamber also supported its conclusion by citing the text of
Security Council Resolution 1511, which also was a unanimous Resolution
based on its Chapter VII authority, reaffirming “the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iraq.”101 In the operative paragraph, the Security
Council determined
that the Governing Council and its ministers are the principal
bodies of the Iraqi interim administration, which, without
prejudice to its further evolution, embodies the sovereignty of
the State of Iraq during the transitional period until an
Official Gazette of the Republic of Iraq, Vol. 23, No. 27 at 2 (July 2, 1980), reprinted in UNITED
STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE, IRAQI LAWS REFERENCED IN THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL
TRIBUNAL (2004) (copy on file with author).
95

Author’s observations in the courthouse and from discussions with trial participants.

Christiane Amanpour, Saddam Hussein Defiant In Court, CNN.COM, Oct. 20, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/19/saddam.trial/index.html.

96

97

Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, supra note 17, at art. 17.

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Mar. 23, 1976, 999 U.N.T.S. 171
(describing analogous provisions derived from international human rights law) [hereinafter
ICCPR].

98

INTERIM CONSTITUTION IRAQ (1970) art. 20, reprinted in UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE,
IRAQI LAWS REFERENCED IN THE STATUTE OF THE IRAQI SPECIAL TRIBUNAL (2004). This principle
is also embodied in Article 19 of the 2005 Iraqi Constitution. See IRAQI CONSTITUTION art. 19,
available
at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/UN_USG_UK_NDI_Agreed_
English_Text_25.01.06-CURRENT.pdf. The Iraqi Law on Criminal Proceedings makes clear that
the judge must release an accused if “there is insufficient evidence for conviction.” Iraqi Law No.
23 on Criminal Proceedings, supra note 9, at para. 203.
99

100

Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 31.

S.C. Res. 1511, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1511
(Oct. 16,
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfileenglish&y=2003&m=October&x=20031016151238yesmikk0.6846125.
101

2003),

available

at
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internationally recognized representative government is
established and assumes the responsibilities of the
Authority.102
Buttressed by the Chapter VII power of the Security Council at the time
of its creation,103 the Iraqi High Criminal Court rested not only on the
authority of the occupation officials, but also directly on the legal power of the
Interim Governing Council responsible for drafting and adopting the original
Statute. Apart from the authority of occupation law that had been conveyed
to the succession of interim Iraqi governments, the opinion notes that 78
percent of the Iraqi people had elected the sovereign Iraqi government that
amended and re-promulgated the original Tribunal Statute in October
2005.104 The opinion also cites the principle embedded in the International
Criminal Court that sovereign states have primacy for enforcing
international norms.105 The rejection of the defense motion and approval of
its formation under the authority granted to the Iraqi Governing Council
creates an almost perfect parallel to the post-World War II occupations.
During these occupations, the British and Americans created guidelines to
direct Germany towards democracy but ultimately gave the Germans great
latitude in rebuilding their country.106
The legality portion of the Dujail Judgment is an important example of
modern state practice that will guide future post-conflict occupations. It
reinforces the premise that the Fourth Geneva Convention does not operate
to doggedly elevate the provisions of domestic law and the structure of
domestic institutions above the pursuit of justice. The duty found in Article

102

Id. ¶ 4.

The ICTY and Iraqi High Criminal Court are thus intellectual twins as they rest on the
authority of the Security Council’s Chapter VII power. The former U.S. Attorney General
Ramsey Clark has attacked the legal authority for forming the ad hoc tribunals in a number of
public comments and letters which raise the almost identical arguments to those raised in the
Dujail
Trial
strategy.
See,
e.g.,
Letter
from
Ramsey
Clark
to
U.N.,
http://www.medialens.org/forum/viewtopic.php?p=1168.
103

The former President of Yugoslavia is on trial for defending Yugoslavia in a
court the Security Council had no power to create. . . . The ICTY and other ad
hoc criminal tribunals created by the Security Council are illegal because the
Charter of the United Nations does not empower the Security Council to
create any criminal court. The language of the Charter is clear. Had such
power been placed in the Charter in 1945 there would be no U.N. None of the
five powers made permanent members of the Security Council in the Charter
would have agreed to submit to a U.N. criminal report.
Id.
104

Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 31.

Michael A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity: Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20, 24–25 (2001).
105

106 Walter M. Hudson, The US Military Government and the Establishment of Democratic
Reform, Federalism, and Constitutionalism During the Occupation of Bavaria, 1945–47, 180 MIL.
L. REV. 115, 123 (2004).
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43 of the Hague Regulations to respect local laws unless “absolutely
prevented” (in French “empêchement absolu”) imposes a seemingly categorical
imperative.107 However, rather than being understood literally, “empêchement
absolu” has been interpreted as the equivalent of “necessité.”108 The Dujail
verdict reinforces this functional meaning. Under the obligations of modern
human rights law, an occupier may amend local law to “remove from the
penal code any punishments that are ‘unreasonable, cruel or inhumane’
together with any discriminatory racial legislation.”109 For example, the
Israeli decision to confer the vote in mayoral elections on women who had not
formerly enjoyed this right would probably comport with the Article 43
obligation of an occupier.110 Despite the minimalist principle, international
law allows reasonable latitude for an occupying power to modify, suspend, or
replace the existing penal structure in the interests of ensuring justice and
the restoration of the rule of law. The Dujail Judgment builds on the state
practice in the post-World War II context that permitted the Allies to set the
feet of the defeated Axis powers “on a more wholesome path”111 rather than
blindly enforcing the institutional and legal constraints that had been the
main bulwarks of tyranny.112
Though Trial Chamber I merely mentions Article 64 of the Fourth
Geneva Convention in passing, its opinion is consistent with the modern
interpretation of the law of occupation. The subtle linkage between Article 43
of the Hague Regulations and Article 64 of the Fourth Geneva Convention
gave the CPA broad discretion to delegate the authority for promulgation of
the Tribunal to the Governing Council as a matter of necessity. Article 64 of
the Fourth Geneva Convention clarified the old Hague Article 43 by
explaining the exception to the minimalist principle in more concrete terms.
In ascertaining the implications of Article 64 with regard to the occupation in
Iraq, it is important to realize that its drafters did not extend the “traditional

Yoram Dinstein, Legislation Under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations: Belligerent
Occupation and Peacebuilding, PROGRAM ON HUMANITARIAN POL. & CONFLICT RES., HARV. U.,
OCCASIONAL PAPER SERIES 8 (2004).

107

108 Id. See also Edmund.H. Schwenk, Legislative Power of the Military Occupant Under Article
43, Hague Regulations, YALE L. J. 393, 399–402 (1945).
109

LESLIE C. GREEN, THE CONTEMPORARY LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 259 (2d ed. 2000).

110

Id.

111

MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 225 (1959).

For example, the oath of the Nazi party was: “I owe inviolable fidelity to Adolf Hitler; I vow
absolute obedience to him and to the leaders he designates for me.” See DREXEL A. SPRECHER,
INSIDE THE NUREMBERG TRIAL: A PROSECUTOR’S COMPREHENSIVE ACCOUNT 1037–38 (1999).
Accordingly, power resided in Hitler, from whom subordinates derived absolute authority in
hierarchical order. This absolute and unconditional obedience to the superior in all areas of
public and private life led in Justice Jackson’s famous words to “a National Socialist despotism
equaled only by the dynasties of the ancient East.” TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 99–100 (1947).
112
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scope of occupation legislation.”113 The Geneva Convention added detail to the
concept of necessity enshrined in the 1907 Article 43 obligation, but it did so
with the intent of protecting the legal rights of the civilian population.114
The plain language of Article 64 must be interpreted in good faith in light
of the object and purpose of the Fourth Convention, which seeks to alleviate
the suffering of the civilian population and ameliorate the potentially adverse
consequences of occupation subsequent to military defeat.115 The first
paragraph strikes a balance between the minimalist intent of the framers
and the overriding purpose of making due allowance both for the rights of the
civilian population and the concurrent right of the occupier to maintain the
security of its forces and property. The second paragraph of Article 64
morphed the implicit meaning of “necessary” drawn from the old Hague
Article 43 into an explicit authority to amend the domestic laws in order to
achieve the core purposes of the Convention. Article 64 has thus been
accepted in light of the common-sense reading and the underlying legal
duties of the occupier to permit modification of domestic law under limited
circumstances.116
113

GEORGE SCHWARZENBERGER, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 194 (1968).

114

Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 59, at art. 64. Article 64 reads as follows:
The penal laws of the occupied territory shall remain in force, with the
exception that they may be repealed or suspended by the Occupying Power in
cases where they constitute a threat to its security or an obstacle to the
application of the present Convention. Subject to the latter consideration and
to the necessity for ensuring the effective administration of justice, the
tribunals of the occupied territory shall continue to function in respect of all
offences covered by the said laws.
The Occupying Power may, however, subject the population of the occupied
territory to provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to
fulfill its obligations under the present Convention, to maintain the orderly
government of the territory, and to ensure the security of the Occupying
Power, of the members and property of the occupying forces or
administration, and likewise of the establishments and lines of
communication used by them.

Id.
115 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31(1), Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331,
reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).

UK MINISTRY OF DEFENCE, THE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT
United States doctrine states that the

116

293 (2004).

occupant may alter, repeal, or suspend laws of the following types:
a. Legislation constituting a threat to its security, such as laws relating to
recruitment and the bearing of arms.
b. Legislation dealing with political process, such as laws regarding the rights
of suffrage and of assembly.
c. Legislation the enforcement of which would be inconsistent with the duties
of the occupant, such as laws establishing racial discrimination.
U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 371.
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At its core, Article 64 protects the rights of citizens in the occupied
territory to a fair and effective system of justice. As a first step, and citing its
obligation to ensure the “effective administration of justice,” the CPA issued
an order suspending the imposition of capital punishment in the criminal
courts of Iraq and prohibiting torture as well as cruel, inhumane, and
degrading treatment in occupied Iraq.117 Exercising his power as the
temporary occupation authority, Ambassador Bremer signed CPA Order No.
7, which amended the Iraqi Criminal Code in other important ways seeking
to suspend or modify laws that “the former regime used . . . as a tool of
repression in violation of internationally recognized human rights.”118 The
subsequent promulgation of CPA Policy Memorandum No. 3 on June 18,
2003, which amended key provisions of the Iraqi Criminal Code in order to
protect the rights of the civilians in Iraq,119 was based on the treaty
obligation to eliminate obstacles to the application of the Geneva
Conventions. Though the CPA Policy aligned Iraqi domestic procedure and
law with the requirements of international law, it was at best a stop gap
measure that was neither designed nor intended to bear the full weight of
prosecuting the range of crimes committed by the regime. Section 1 of the
original June 18, 2003 Policy Memorandum No. 3 expressly focused on the
“need to transition” to an effective administration of domestic justice that had
been weaned from a “dependency on military support.”120
The authority to “subject the population of the occupied territory to
provisions which are essential to enable the Occupying Power to fulfill its
obligation under the present Convention,” in turn permitted the delegation of
authority to the Interim Governing Council needed to draft and adopt the
Statute of the Tribunal. Article 47 of the Fourth Convention makes clear that
such “provisions” may include sweeping changes to the domestic legal and
government structures. Article 47 implicitly concedes power to the occupying
force to “change . . . the institutions or government” of the occupied territory,
so long as those changes do not deprive the population of the benefits of that
Convention.121 Thus, the CPA lawfully could not have hidden behind the fig
117 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number No. 7, Doc. No CPA/ORD/7 at sec. 2–3 (June 9,
2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/index.html#Orders.
118

Id.

Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum Number 3, revised on June 27, 2004, available
at
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAMEMO_3_Criminal_Procedures__Rev_
.pdf.
119

120

Copy on file with author.

Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 59, at art. 47. Article 47 also prevented the CPA from
effecting changes that would undermine the rights enjoyed by the civilian population “by any
agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying
Power.” Id. See also U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 60, ¶ 365. United States Army
doctrine reflects this understanding of the normative relationship with the reminder that
“restrictions placed upon the authority of a belligerent government cannot be avoided by a
system of using a puppet government, central or local, to carry out acts which would have been
unlawful if performed directly by the occupant.” Id. ¶ 366 (further specifying that “Acts induced
121
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leaf of domestic decision making. The CPA could not have allowed domestic
authorities in occupied Iraq to create a process that would have undermined
the human rights of those Iraqi citizens accused of the most severe human
rights abuses during the period of the “entombed regime.” The Commentary
to the Fourth Geneva Convention on the protection of civilians also makes
clear that the occupying power may modify domestic institutions (which
would include the judicial system and the laws applicable thereto) when the
existing institutions or government of the occupied territory operate to
deprive human beings of “the rights and safeguards provided for them” under
the Fourth Convention.122 These provisions of occupation law are consistent
with the Allied experience during the post-World War II occupations. They
were intended to permit future occupation forces to achieve the salutary
effects inherent in rebuilding or restructuring domestic legal systems when
the demands of justice require such reconstruction. Against that legal
backdrop, direct CPA promulgation of the Statute and the accompanying
reforms to the existing Iraqi court system could have been justified on the
basis of any of the three permissible purposes specified in Article 64 of the
Fourth Convention fulfilling its treaty obligation to protect civilians,
maintaining orderly government over a restless population demanding
accountability for the crimes suffered under Saddam, or enhancing the
security of Coalition forces.
IV.

THE LEX MITIOR PRINCIPLE

The Trial Chamber’s findings with regard to legality formed a necessary
predicate to resolving a critical issue raised sua sponte by Trial Chamber I
judges. The death penalty has been both permitted and utilized within Iraqi
criminal courts throughout the modern era and dates back to the Code of
Hammurabi in practice.123 The Iraqi Penal Code of 1969 listed the death
penalty among the range of permitted penalties for criminal offenses.124
However, as noted above, Ambassador Bremer promulgated Coalition
Provisional Order No. 7 in June 2003 seeking to align Iraqi practice with
international human rights norms during the period of occupation.125
Regardless of the procedural forms adopted, international law is clear that no
or compelled by the occupant are nonetheless its acts”).
122 Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, in THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949: COMMENTARY VOL. IV 274
(Pictet ed., 1958).
123

Author’s observation based on numerous comments by Iraqi jurists and prosecutors.

Iraqi Penal Code of 1969, Chapter V, § 1, para. 85, available at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/Iraqi_Penal_Code_1969.pdf.
“The
primary
penalties are: 1) death penalty, 2) life imprisonment, 3) imprisonment for a term of years, 4)
penal servitude, 5) detention, 6) a fine, 7) confinement in a school for young offenders, 8)
confinement in a reform school.” Id. The subsequent sections specify a range of procedural
obligations and limitations on the actual imposition of capital sentences. Id.

124

125 L. Paul Bremer, Coalitional Provisional Authority Order Number 7, Penal Code (June 18,
2003), available at http://www.aina.org/books/cpapenalcode.htm.
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accused should face punishment unless convicted pursuant to a fair trial
affording all of the essential guarantees embodied in widespread state
practice.126 The affirmative obligations of Article 47 of the Fourth Geneva
Convention127 required a CPA role to ensure that the judicial structure that
emerged as a function of Iraqi domestic politics and was promulgated as a
domestic statute fully complied with relevant human rights obligations.128
Section 3, Paragraph 1 of CPA Order No. 7 was the most controversial
provision, because it provided that “capital punishment is suspended. In each
case where the death penalty is the only available penalty prescribed for an
offense, the court may substitute the lesser penalty of life imprisonment, or

126 For a summary of state practice and its implementation in treaty norms and military manuals
around the world, see JEAN-MARIE HENKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, Vol. I, 352–75 (2005) [hereinafter ICRC STUDY].
127 Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 59, at art. 47. Article 47 also prevented the CPA from
effecting changes that would undermine the rights enjoyed by the civilian population “by any
agreement concluded between the authorities of the occupied territories and the Occupying
Power.” Id.
128 A full discussion of the extent to which human rights law applies in an occupation
environment is beyond the scope of this paper. There is a growing awareness that some aspects
of human rights may apply extraterritorially alongside the conventional obligations found in
occupation law. The precise interrelationship between occupation law and human rights norms is
debatable and ill-defined at present. See, e.g., Bankovic et. al. v. Belgium and 16 Other
Contracting States, App. No. 52207/99, Eur. Ct. H.R., para 71 (2001) (rejected on jurisdictional
grounds) (declaring in dicta on the one hand that the European Convention may impose
obligations on States anywhere they exercise “effective control” while in another paragraph,
para. 80, limiting that gratuitous language to territory that “for the specific circumstances,
would normally be covered by the Convention” which means those state parties signatory).
Contra, Issa et al. v. Turkey, App. No. 31821/96, Eur. Ct. H.R., 30 (2000). Both bodies of law
serve to protect fundamental human values, albeit in differing manners and from differing
jurisprudential frameworks. Obliquely referring to the connection between the two distinct
bodies of law, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights noted that:

[w]hile the extraterritorial application of the American Declaration has not
been placed at issue by the parties, the Commission finds it pertinent to note
that, under certain circumstances, the exercise of its jurisdiction over acts
with an extraterritorial locus will not only be consistent with but required by
the norms which pertain. The fundamental rights of the individual are
proclaimed in the Americas on the basis of the principles of equality and nondiscrimination—without distinction as to race, nationality, creed or sex.
Given that individual rights inhere simply by virtue of a person's humanity,
each American State is obliged to uphold the protected rights of any person
subject to its jurisdiction. While this most commonly refers to persons within
a state's territory, it may, under given circumstances, refer to conduct with
an extraterritorial locus where the person concerned is present in the
territory of one state, but subject to the control of another state–usually
through the acts of the latter’s agents abroad. In principle, the inquiry turns
not on the presumed victim's nationality or presence within a particular
geographic area, but on whether, under the specific circumstances, the State
observed the rights of a person subject to its authority and control.
Inter-American Commission, Coard et al. v. United States, Case 10.951, Inter-Am
C.H.R., Report No. 109/99, OEA/Ser.L./V, ¶ 37 (1999).
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such other lesser penalty as provided for in the Penal Code.”129 Despite the
promulgation of CPA Order No. 7 and its temporary abolition of capital
sentences, the original Tribunal Statute adopted by the Interim Governing
Council in December 2003 permitted the range of punishments “prescribed by
the Penal Code of 1969,” and this language was retained in each of the
subsequent legislative enactments following the restoration of full
sovereignty.130
During the Dujail trial, the defense never raised the apparent conflict
between the sentencing provisions of the Statute and the enactment of its
original version during the occupation period under which the use of capital
punishment was not permitted. Enshrined in Article 15 of the ICCPR, the
principle of lex mitior requires that if the applicable law is changed so as to
allow for a lighter penalty subsequent to the commission of a crime, the
offender shall benefit from the change.131 The Iraqi Penal Code of 1969
expressly adopts the principle of lex mitior in Section 2(2). This section reads
as follows:
(1) The occurrence and consequences of an offence are
determined in accordance with the law in force at the time of
its commission and the time of commission is determined by
reference to the time at which the criminal act occurs and not
by reference to the time when the consequence of the offence
is realised.
(2) However, if one or more laws are enacted after an offence
has been committed and before final judgment is given, then
the law that is most favourable to the convicted person is
applied.132
Hence, the Dujail Trial Chamber faced a potential legal barrier to even
considering any capital sentence. The Trial Judgment addressed the lex
mitior issue as its first substantive issue. One of the central pillars of the law
of occupation is that the occupying power does not acquire sovereignty over

129 Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number No. 7, Doc No CPA/ORD/7, Sec. 3(1) (June 9,
2003), available at http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/index.html#Orders.
130

Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, supra note 17, at art. 24.

131

ICCPR, supra note 98, art. 15. Article 15 reads:
(1) No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act
or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or
international law, at the time when it was committed. Nor shall a heavier
penalty be imposed than the one that was applicable at the time when the
criminal offence was committed. If, subsequent to the commission of the
offence, provision is made by law for the imposition of the lighter penalty, the
offender shall benefit thereby.

Id.
132

Iraqi Penal Code of 1969, supra note 124, Sec. 2(2).
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the territory. Because an occupying power is merely a temporary custodian of
the status quo in the territory it controls,133 an assertion of de jure authority
through annexation is fundamentally at odds with the temporary nature of
occupation.134 During the fourteen months of occupation, the CPA effected a
displacement, rather than a replacement, of Iraqi sovereignty. Trial Chamber
I specifically highlighted its unanimous opinion that “the Temporary
Coalition Government is considered a transitional authority in Iraq until
achieving full sovereignty according to Article 43 of The Hague Laws of 1907
the orientation of the occupier is to respect the language, norms and
traditions of the occupied country.”135
Lex mitior is meant to give the accused the benefits of a change in the
value judgments of society at large. Laws imposing new and lighter penalties
are often the concrete expression of some change in the attitude of the
community towards the offense in question.136 As a result, the principle of lex
mitior “applies only to cases in which the commission of the criminal offence
and the subsequent imposition of a penalty took place within one and the
same jurisdiction.”137 In the context of the Iraqi Penal Code of 1969, the
phrase “one or more laws” clearly indicates that a law must be enacted within
the formal process of the domestic law for lex mitior to attach. The concept of
“one or more laws” found in Section 2(2) of the Penal Code parallels the
phrase “provision made by law” found in Article 15 of the ICCPR.138 The Trial
CHRISTOPHER GREENWOOD, ESSAYS ON WAR IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 357 (2006); UK WAR
OFFICE, MANUAL OF MILITARY LAW, III: THE LAW OF WAR ON LAND ¶ 510 (1958); see also
GERHARD VON GLAHN, THE OCCUPATION OF ENEMY TERRITORY: A COMMENTARY OF THE LAW AND
PRACTICE OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 27–37 (1957); U.S. ARMY FIELD MANUAL, supra note 60,
¶ 358:
133

Being an incident of war, military occupation confers upon the invading force
the means of exercising control for the period of occupation. It does not
transfer the sovereignty to the occupant, but simply the authority or power to
exercise some of the rights of sovereignty. The exercise of these rights results
from the established power of the occupant and from the necessity of
maintaining law and order.
Id.
Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross, supra note 122 (“[T]he occupation of territory in wartime is
essentially a temporary, de facto situation, which deprives the occupied Power of neither its
statehood nor its sovereignty; it merely interferes with its power to exercise its rights.”); Frederic
L. Kirgis, Security Council Resolution 1483 on the Rebuilding of Iraq, ASIL INSIGHTS (2003),
available at http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh107.htm (“Internationally, though, the fact that a
country is occupied and is under the effective, but temporary, control of the occupying powers
does not affect its continuing status as a sovereign state. Iraq remains a state as a matter of
international law, with rights and obligations toward other sovereign states.”).
134

135

Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 3.

136 Commission on Human Rights, 5th Session (1949), 6th Session (1950), 8th Session (1952)
[E/CN.4/SR.112, p.8 (F)].
137 Momir Nikolic, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, Judicial Supplement No. 46, ¶ 163, Sentencing
Judgment, (Dec. 2, 2003).
138

ICCPR, supra note 98, at art. 15(1).
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Chamber implicitly concluded that a “procedure made by law” is one that has
been enacted in accordance with Iraqi legislative procedure. The CPA’s
purpose was to protect the people of Iraq, not to speak for them.139 Coalition
Provisional Authority Order Section 7, paragraph 3, contained no measure of
public opinion but only represented the operational necessity under which
the Coalition was acting in light of its powers under occupation law. Based on
the findings of the Trial Chamber and the status of the CPA under Article 43,
the CPA was not, and did not consider itself to be, the voice of the people,
since it was not the legislative organ of the Iraqi people.140
The Cassation Panel Opinion addressed this issue squarely and upheld
the assessment of the Trial Chamber that lex mitior was inapplicable due to
the ephemeral nature of CPA authority by holding that CPA Order No. 7 did
not stem from the Legislative Authority in Iraq, nor did it include any
standards of the public opinion, but rather it merely reflected the necessity
that the Coalition was supposed to act according to and in light of the
authority entrusted in it in accordance with the occupation law being the
interim sponsor during that present period in Iraq. Because that Authority
had no legal sovereignty over the occupied region, and consequently, the
Coalition Authority was kind of a separate legal jurisdiction, according to
well-established international laws, the Iraqi High Tribunal was not obliged
to implement its rulings or its laws. The order of the Interim Coalition
Authority, which suspended execution of capital punishment, was merely a
temporary procedure imposed by an interim authority, and therefore, this
law could not have been considered a law issued before the sentencing and
consequently would have the power to make the law of capital punishment
null and void and a law that would be an applicable legal choice of the legal
judgment.141

Paul Bowers, Iraq: Law of Occupation, Research Paper 03/51, House of Commons Library 19
(June 2, 2003).

139

140 United Kingdom Foreign Secretary Jack Straw commented on trials for members of the
Saddam Hussein regime in response to a question by Douglas Hogg: “We want the Iraqi people,
in the main, to take responsibility for ensuring justice in respect of former members of the
regime.” HOUSE OF PARLIAMENT COUNCILS DEBATE, cc 32-3 at 29 (Apr. 28, 2003), available at
http://www.parliament.uk/commons/lib/research/rp2003/rp03-051.pdf. Pierre-Richard Prosper,
the U.S. Ambassador for War Crimes, was interviewed by the Daily Telegraph in April 2003. The
report gave the following account of his arguments:

As for Saddam’s crimes, he believes that the Iraqis themselves should take
the lead, and that their former president and his henchmen should be tried in
Iraq itself. We really need to allow the Iraqis the opportunity to do this. They
are the victims. It is their country that was oppressed and abused. We want
them to have a leadership role, and we’re there to be supportive.
Toby Harnden, Man with a mission to put Saddam in the dock: Pierre-Richard Prosper, the US
Ambassador for War Crimes, tells Toby Harnden in Washington why he would love to look the
fallen dictator in the eye, DAILY TELEGRAPH, April 21, 2003, at 12.
141

Cassation Panel, Iraqi High Criminal Court, al-Dujail Final Opinion, supra note 7, at 13.
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THE DUJAIL VERDICTS: FINDINGS AND SENTENCES

The International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg set the precedent for
simplifying evidentiary requirements in favor of a full airing of available
facts before a panel of judges. Justice Robert H. Jackson noted that “peculiar
and technical rules of evidence developed under the common law system of
jury trials to prevent the jury from being influenced by improper evidence
constitute a complex and artificial science,” and accordingly accepted that
rules of evidence at Nuremberg should put the premium on the probative
value of the evidence.142 Although dispensing with rigid rules of evidence
gave the International Military Tribunal “a large and somewhat
unpredictable discretion,” it also permitted both the prosecution and defense
to select evidence on the basis of “what it was worth as proof rather than
whether it complied with some technical requirement.”143 Since 1945, rather
than operating under restrictive rules of evidence, all of the tribunals
applying international humanitarian law have permitted evidence so long as
it is “relevant and necessary for the determination of the truth.”144 This
standard drawn from the International Criminal Court Statute compares
favorably to the Iraqi High Criminal Court Rule of Procedure that permits
the Trial Chamber to admit “any relevant evidence which it deems to have
probative value.”145
The procedures for the introduction of evidence and the consideration of
verdicts are perhaps the most notable aspects of the co-mingling of common
and civil law traditions. Many commentators from outside Iraq do not
understand the nature of trial evidence in relation to the broader referral file.
As one Iraqi judge put it, “[I]n our system, only the evidence speaks.”146
Rather than developing a straitjacket set of rules related to the introduction
of evidence, the Dujail Trial Chamber had the broader mandate to “apply
rules of evidence which will best favour [sic] a fair determination of the
matter before it and are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and general

REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIBUNALS 11, DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 3080,
WASHINGTON D.C., xi (1949). Interestingly, as a matter of historical record, the teams of
international prosecutors at Nuremberg did not develop detailed “elements of crimes” that have
become an accepted feature of every subsequent international process.
142

143

Id.

United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), art. 69(3), reprinted
in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998).
144

145 Tribunal Rules of Procedure, supra note15, Rule 79. This provision is adjacent to the common
sense caveat that the Trial Chamber may “exclude evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the potential for unfair prejudice, considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” Id., Rule 59.
146 Interview with Judge Ra’id Juhi, Chief Investigative Judge, Iraqi High Criminal Court, in
Baghdad (Aug. 2, 2006).
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principles of law.”147 The lengthy Trial Judgment contains a wealth of detail
regarding facts, inferences, trial motions, allegations, and outright false
testimony in the Dujail case.148 The Judgment is an exhaustive catalogue of
the questions raised by the legal elements of each offense alleged and a
recitation of the exculpatory and inculpatory evidence raised against each
defendant for each charge. There is a great deal of discussion regarding the
inferences to be drawn by the judges regarding the modes of individual
participation in the offenses.
Prior to assessing any verdicts, the Trial Chamber analyzed the propriety
of assessing guilt on the basis of crimes against humanity. Crimes against
humanity have never been reduced to a globally-applicable general
convention, though the corpus is expanded and captured in the Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court.149 Similar to the European Court of
Human Rights analysis in Kolk and Kislyiy v. Estonia,150 the Trial Chamber
engaged in an extensive analysis to determine whether the Iraqi High
Criminal Court lawfully could impose punishment for crimes against
humanity committed in 1982, even though they were not specifically

147

Tribunal Rules of Procedure, supra note15, Rule 79.

While the Trial Chamber I findings can be simply stated, they rest upon an array of detailed
factual underpinnings and analytical comparisons to the elements that are well beyond the scope
of this paper. For example, no defendant was convicted of the crime against humanity of enforced
disappearances because the judges concluded that the elements of the crime were not satisfied
based on the available evidence. For a discussion of this crime with regard to Saddam Hussein,
see Case No. 1/9 First/2005 Al Dujail Lawsuit (Case), English Translation of Dujail Trial
Chamber Opinion, Part 3, 41–43 (2006) [hereinafter Part III, Unofficial Translation of Dujail
Trial
Chamber
Opinion],
available
at
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/
dujail_opinion_pt3.pdf.
148

After examining and debating the available evidence in this case, it has
become clear to the court that some of the bases that were required for
establishing this crime are unavailable. Thus, it is not possible to hold any of
the defendants in this case, including the accused Saddam Hussein,
accountable for acts that do not form a crime in accordance with international
law, where nothing has been proven to this court that anyone of the relatives
of the victims has submitted a request to any government agency asking for
the fate, or the whereabouts, of the victims . . . This will lead to the
unavailability of another element, which is that the refusal to acknowledge
the deprivation of members from the Dujail residents of their freedom, or
providing information about their fate, or whereabouts, had been upheld by
the State, or by a political organization; or by its permission, support, or
approval, and because it has not been proven to this court that there was
refusal by one of the government agencies, or the Ba’ath party, to
acknowledge that because no one from the relatives of the Dujail residents
has submitted an inquiry regarding this issue.
Id.
149

Rome Statute of Int’l Crim. Ct. art. 7, July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90.

See Kolk & Kislyiy v. Estonia, ECHR Judgment, Application No. 24018/04, Jan. 26, 2006.
According to the European Court of Human Rights, crimes against humanity were proscribed
and defined sufficiently by 1949 to permit the conviction of Estonian nationals in 1994 based on
a domestic statute enacted in 1992 that created jurisdiction over crimes against humanity. Id.
150
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criminalized in Iraqi domestic law until the December 2003 original IST
Statute, which was later revalidated in Article 130 of the 2005 Iraqi
constitution151 and amended in the legislative revisions promulgated in
October 2005. The Trial Chamber discussion is a sophisticated discourse on
the interface between international and domestic law as well as between
treaties and international custom as authoritative sources of law.152 Like
every international tribunal going back to Nuremberg,153 Trial Chamber I
concluded that “the actions attributed to the accused in al-Dujail case, if
verified are considered international and internal crimes simultaneously, and
the committing of such crimes is considered a violation of the international
criminal law and international human law, at the same time considered a
violation of the Iraqi law.”154 By logical extension, the international character
of the crimes against humanity alleged in connection with al-Dujail required
“additional elements other than those stipulated in the Iraqi penal code.”155
Holding that crimes against humanity, when committed during a time of
peace, had become international crimes prior to 1982, the Statute of the Iraqi
High Criminal Court comported with human rights norms.156 In the words of
the Trial Judgment, the procedural and due process principle of nonretroactivity cannot be perverted to result in impunity for those who
committed crimes against humanity during the Ba’athist era:
Therefore, it can be said that the tribunal law did not
stipulate the criminal nature of these acts and it is not their
originator, rather it merely transferred these crimes from the
international domain where they already existed and still
exist, to the national domain. In another sense, the tribunal
law took over what was included in international penal law
which incriminates the acts that form international crimes
and transferred them to domestic law, based on the theory of
reception, which is well known in the field of international
law.

CONST. REPUBLIC OF IRAQ, art. 134. (“The Iraqi High Tribunal shall continue its duties as an
independent judicial body, in examining the crimes of the defunct dictatorial regime and its
symbols. The Council of Representatives shall have the right to dissolve it by law after the
completion
of
its
work.”)
Unofficial
English
translation
available
at
http://www.law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/UN_USG_UK_NDI_Agreed_English_Text_25.0
1.06-CURRENT.pdf.

151

152

Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 35–44.

153 Guenael Mettraux, Crimes Against Humanity in the Jurisprudence of the International
Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and for Rwanda, 43 HARV. INT’L L.J. 237 (2002).
154

Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 41.

155

Id.

Art. 15 of the ICCPR, reads “[n]o one shall be held guilty of any criminal offense on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offense, under national or international
law, at the time when it was committed.” ICCPR, supra note 98, at art. 15(1) (emphasis added).
156
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The principle of non-retroactivity of criminal law is respected
for the purposes of preventing injustice and protecting the
innocent. However, objecting or taking exception to it without
a sound legal basis for the purpose of absolving individuals
accused of committing international crimes from criminal
responsibility means that justice is denied and injustice is
dedicated.157
Because a number of defendants raised the retroactivity defense on
appeal, the Cassation Chamber also addressed its applicability to crimes
against humanity committed before the enactment of the domestic statutes.
Though it has gaps in a number of other areas, the language of the Appeals
Opinion is clear and correct in rejecting the defense allegation:
[I]f a provision is stated in an international treaty or
agreement for a specific incriminating act, the application of
this provision on acts perpetrated before its issuance does not
mean that the provision was applied retroactively. This
provision was preceded by international norms which entail
non-legitimacy of the act. The provisions did no more than
record and clarify the substance of previous norms and
traditions for the perpetrator of the act and his presence.
Therefore, the principle of legitimizing crimes and criminal
penalties is consistent with justice principles since it is a
fundamental principle in all laws, including international
criminal law.158
Having established the legality of the tribunal’s formation, and its subject
matter competence to adjudicate crimes against humanity, the Trial
Chamber sentenced seven defendants and fully acquitted Muhammad
‘Azzawi ‘Ali, a former Ba’ath party official from the region of al-Dujail, due to
a lack of evidence. The Trial Judgment contains a great deal of detail, broken
down by crime and defendant, establishing the widespread and systematic
nature of the crimes, as well as detailing the mens rea of each accused. The
convictions break down as follows:159 Saddam Hussein and Barzan al-Tikriti,
the former intelligence chief and the half-brother of Hussein, were found
guilty of “deliberate” killing, forcible deportation, and torture and were
sentenced to two ten-year prison terms and death by hanging; Awad Hamed

157 Case No. 1/9 First/2005 Al-Dujail Lawsuit (Case), English Translation of Dujail Trial
Chamber Opinion, Part II, 4 (2006), available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/
dujail_opinion_pt2.pdf [hereinafter Part II, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber
Opinion].
158

Cassation Panel, Iraqi High Criminal Court, al-Dujail Final Opinion, supra note 7, at 12.

See Case No. 1/9 First/2005 Al Dujail Lawsuit (Case), English Translation of Dujail Trial
Chamber Opinion, Part VI, 51–54 (2006), available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/
documents/dujail_opinion_pt6.pdf [hereinafter Part VI, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial
Chamber Opinion].
159
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al-Bandar, the head of the Revolutionary Court, was found guilty of willful
killing and was sentenced to death by hanging; Taha Yassin Ramadan, the
former vice president, was found guilty of willful killing, deportation, torture,
and other inhumane acts and was sentenced to life imprisonment160 and to
three other prison terms; former Ba’ath party officials from the al-Dujail
region, ‘Abdallah al-Ruwaid and ‘Ali Dayih ‘Ali, were found guilty of willful
killing and sentenced to fifteen years in prison; former Ba’ath party official
from the al-Dujail region, Mizher al-Ruwaid, was found guilty of willful
killing and torture and was sentenced to fifteen years and seven years
imprisonment. The Trial Chamber also “decided to confiscate the movable
and immovable money belonging to the convicted under Article 24/Sixth of
the Iraqi Supreme Criminal Court law No.10 – 2005” in order to preserve
assets on behalf of any victims resorting to civil courts “in order to claim
compensation for damages incurred as a result of crimes committed against
them.”161
The conviction of Judge Awad Hamad al-Bandar for the crime against
humanity of willful murder was one of the most significant aspects of the
Dujail Trial. This marked the first time since World War II that a jurist had
been convicted of crimes against humanity for perverting the power of the
law into the tool of political power. A U.S. military commission convicted ten
Nazi-era judges in the famous case United States of America v. Alstötter et al.,
known worldwide as the Justice Case and later fictionalized in the famous
film Judgment at Nuremberg.162 Bandar, whose lead attorney in the Dujail
Trial was his son, served as the President of the Revolutionary Command
Council Court (“RCCC”). The Ba’athist regime never could destroy the Iraqi
judiciary completely, and Saddam therefore created the Revolutionary
Command Council Court as a convenient mechanism for imposing his
personal will in the guise of justice. The Revolutionary Command Council
Courts had jurisdiction over any cases directed by Saddam, in particular
national security matters.163 Defendants could expect little or no due process
160 The Cassation Panel upheld the convictions against Taha Yassin Ramadan but ordered “the
repeal of the sentencing paragraph related to the punishment of life imprisonment” and ordered
that his case be sent back to Trial Chamber I “for the purpose of strengthening the penalty
against him and raising it to the appropriate legal limit.” Cassation Panel, Iraqi High Criminal
Court, al-Dujail Final Opinion, supra note 7, at 20. This aspect of the Cassation Decision was one
of the most troubling components of the entire Dujail trial. It is not explained in the written
opinion, and there is no delineation of the matters in aggravation that warranted a more severe
punishment. The decision carried overtones of political manipulation of the judicial process,
prompting the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights to submit a specific brief requesting
that the capital sentence be reversed. Brief for U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights as
Amicus Curiae, in the Matter of Sentencing of Taha Yassin Ramadan (2007), available at
http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/documents/arbour_amicus_curiae_brief_en.pdf. Ramadan was
hanged until death.
161

Part VI, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 159, at 52.

162 See U.S. v. Alstottler et. al., 3 T.W.C.1 (1948), 6 L.R.T.W.C.1 (1948), 14 Ann. Dig. 278 (1948),
available at http://www.law.umkc.edu/faculty/projects/ftrials/nuremberg/Alstoetter.htm.
163

INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, IRAQ AND THE RULE OF LAW 109–13 (1994).
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and their verdicts could not be appealed, however, President Hussein
personally had to approve death sentences.164 On May 27, 1984, Saddam
referred 148 men and boys to the RCCC for “trial” whereupon Bandar
dutifully sentenced them to death.165 During Bandar’s closing argument,
which was delivered by a stand-by counsel from the Defense Office of the
Tribunal, Judge Ra’ouf scornfully looked down and asked Bandar, “[W]hat
kind of judge were you?”166 Bandar scowled back in reply and, in a face
dripping with contempt, said “I was the best.”167 The Trial Chamber noted
that Judge Bandar characterized the civilians as “ravaging traitors” in the
papers for the case,168 and supported its findings regarding the criminal use
of an ostensibly legal process by observing that the systematic “attack
directed against the civilian population” required to constitute a crime
against humanity need not be a purely military attack.169
The Trial Judgment describes a great weight of evidence leading it to
“form a solid conviction without any reasonable doubt” that the civilians were
sentenced to death without any trial at all.170 In fact, the Trial Judgment
language describing Bandar’s death decree could not be more pointed or more
poignant to the ears of a professional attorney:
The decision issued by the defendant A-Bandar and with the
members of the so-called Revolutionary Court on June 14,
1984 is in fact an order of murder and not a judgment issued
by virtue of the law and in conformity with it. This order was
indeed fulfilled and more than 90 citizens of Al Dujail were

164 The signed death warrants were available at trial and entered into evidence, Trial Exhibit 8,
available at http://law.case.edu/saddamtrial/exhibits/.
165

Id., Exhibit 4.

166

The author observed this exchange firsthand, and quotes are taken from personal notes.

167

Id.

168

Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 14.

169

Id.

Part II, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 157, at 13. Some
of the facts leading to this conclusion were that “after carrying out the death penalty in 1985, at
least between 4 and 14 individuals who were sentenced to death were still alive.” Id. at 20.
170

[I]n any case, the tribunal spent enormous efforts in this regard and secured
all the papers of case No. 944/C/1984 comprised, of 361 pages and gave all the
lawyers of the defence, including the lawyer of the defendant Awad al-Bandar
copies of all of those papers, as demonstrated by receipt attached to the case
papers dated June 19, 2006. The tribunal notes that all of these 361 pages did
not contain any of the procedures of the alleged trial, including the absence of
any of the victims (defendants’) testimonies before the (disbanded)
Revolutionary Court in this case.
Id. at 22.

66

TRANSNATIONAL LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

[Vol. 17:31

killed on the pretext of the death penalty against them which
was issued by the court and carried out by hanging.171
The decision to convict Bandar of willful killing was predicated on the
conclusion that he had actual knowledge of the attack directed against the
citizens of al-Dujail, and that he used his office to participate in that attack.
This widespread and organized (systematic) attack by these
forces and organizations against the civilian population of alDujail, and later on other governmental bodies participated in
the attack . . . . Amongst those governmental organizations
was the (disbanded) Revolutionary Tribunal, which was
presided over by the defendant Awad Al-Bandar, and which
took part in the attacks against the civilian population of Al
Dujail in pursuance of the policy of the state and Ba’ath party
which called for conducting that attack or furthered such a
policy. This tribunal is also convinced that this widespread
attack included organized detention and imprisonment of
civilians from Al Dujail, as well as torturing, abusing and
murdering them.172
In approving the death sentence against Awwad Hamad Al-Bandar, the
Cassation Panel concluded that he committed, as a principal actor, a joint
criminal act that represented a premeditated murder as a crime against
humanity. The conclusion that he “issued verdicts to execute a large number
of citizens of Dujail through a mock trial” stands in sharp contrast to the
range of due process available to the Dujail defendants on trial before Trial
Chamber I. One of the great ironies for the future of Iraq is that the graphic
juxtaposition between law and power that the founders of the Iraqi High
Criminal Court intended was largely lost in the controversy and
condemnation of the lengthy trial in the public discourse.
For specialists in international humanitarian law, the convictions for the
crime against humanity of inhumane acts are also noteworthy. The crime of
“other inhumane acts” is a residual category of crimes against humanity that
originated in Article 6(c) of the Nuremberg Charter and was also included in
the Tokyo Charter as well as Allied Control Council Law No. 10 applicable in
occupied Germany.173 The crime of inhumane acts was “designed as a
residual category, as it was felt undesirable for this category to be
exhaustively enumerated. An exhaustive categorization would merely create
opportunities for evasion of the letter of the prohibition.”174 Some courts have
171

Id. at 32–33.

172

Part II, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 12, at 29.

See Prosecutor v. Milomir Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24-A, Appeals Judgment, ¶ 315 (Mar. 22,
2006), available at http://www.un.org/icty/stakic/appeal/judgement/sta-ajo60322e.htm.
173

174 Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, et. al., Case No. IT-95-16-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 563 (Jan. 14, 2000)
Prosecutor v. Kupreskic cautioned that there
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found that convictions of the same accused for both the crime of inhumane
acts and the crime of torture are cumulative.175
Prior to the sporadic small arms fire on July 8, 1982, the Trial Judgment
describes al-Dujail as a “safe town . . . rich in fruit gardens irrigated from the
Tigris River through canals and water pumps.”176 The people of al-Dujail
enjoyed a good standard of living and the local party membership “was mixed
between Shiites and Sunnites.”177 Based on the destruction of the forests
around Basra, Taha Yassin Ramadan proposed that the regime destroy the
orchards and fields around Dujail. An eyewitness testified that three months
after the incident, the tractors, bulldozers, international-type cars, and sixwheel drive vehicles came and loaded the trees and disposed of them outside
the city.178 The fields and orchards of Dujail were razed and all of the fruit
trees carted off and destroyed. The lifestyle and affluence of the families of
Dujail died as the orchards were pulled from the ground. In open court, Taha
Ramadan indignantly defended his actions in conceiving and implementing
the destruction of the orchards. On March 14, 2006, he argued that regarding
“the fields of al-Dujail, due to what has happened, it is natural and it is the
government’s right as long as there is a public interest at stake or a need for
taking over of farms, buildings, or estates in exchange of an appropriate
compensation.”179 The government interest to which he referred was to
punish all of the inhabitants of Dujail following what Saddam perceived as
an attempt to kill him. As international humanitarian law is applied more
frequently, the Trial Chamber’s decision to convict Taha Yassin Ramadan for
the crime of inhumane acts may become the very embodiment of that catchall crime. Destroying the sustenance and prosperity of an entire village is the
epitome of acts “intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to the
body or to the mental or physical health.”180
VI.

CONCLUSION

As the era of international enforcement of humanitarian law dawned in
response to what President Roosevelt later described as the “blackest crimes

is a concern that this category lacks precision and is too general to provide a
safe yardstick for the work of the Tribunal and hence, that it is contrary to
the principle of the ‘specificity’ of criminal law. It is thus imperative to
establish what is included within this category.
Id.
175

Prosecutor v. Milan Martic, Case No. IT-95-11-T, Trial Judgment, ¶ 477 (Jan. 12, 2007).

176

Part I, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 36, at 3.

177

Id.

178

Part VI, Unofficial Translation of Dujail Trial Chamber Opinion, supra note 159, at 9.

179

Id. at 2.

180

Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, supra note 17, at art. 12(f).
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in all history,”181 the Allied Powers issued the Moscow Declaration on October
30, 1943.182 In the context of the current debate over internationalizing
justice, it is important to note that the Moscow Declaration favored
punishment through the national courts in the countries where the crimes
were committed.183 The Declaration specifically stated that German criminals
were to be “sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were
done in order that they may be judged and punished according to the laws of
these liberated countries and of the free governments which will be erected
therein.”184 As the International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg
opened, Justice Robert Jackson’s magnificent opening statement185 reiterated
the truth that the IMT was merely an alternative to domestic courts for
prosecuting the “symbols of fierce nationalism and of militarism.”186
The Iraqi decision to create a Tribunal and prosecute the leading
Ba’athists who terrorized the Iraqi people and dominated Iraqi society for
more than three decades was a bold gambit. The Iraqi High Criminal Court
was conceived and created at precisely the time when Iraqi politicians were
discovering the reality of running a nation and reestablishing order that
could contain sectarian and tribal rivalries. In many areas, the fissures of
tribal loyalty, family bonds, and religious perspective became the poles that
attracted political support. Against this backdrop, all the tribes, regions,
religions, and economic classes within Iraq were united by a deep need to
expose the crimes of the regime and hold the regime accountable for their
suffering.
As Saddam Hussein entered the court on the first day of the al-Dujail
trial, the dream of justice seemed unattainable as he rebuked the judge. “I
didn’t say ‘former president,’ I said ‘president’ and I have rights according to

Statement by the President, Mar. 24, 1944, reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIBUNALS
12, DEPARTMENT OF STATE PUBLICATION 3080, WASHINGTON D.C. (1945) [hereinafter JACKSON
REPORT].
181

182

MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 146–47 (2007).

IX Department of State Bulletin, No. 228, 310, reprinted in JACKSON REPORT, supra note 179
at 11. The Moscow Declaration was actually issued to the Press on November 1, 1943. For an
account of the political and legal maneuvering behind the effort to bring this stated war aim into
actuality, see PETER MAGUIRE, LAW AND WAR: AN AMERICAN STORY 85–110 (2000).
183

184

Id.

In the words of one aging Nuremberg prosecutor, “There would have been no Nuremberg
without Robert Jackson. He was courageous beyond limit and stuck to his vision of a trial in
which justice would prevail. Jackson accomplished his goal . . . and he seemed perilously alone in
his quest for justice.” Henry T. King, Jr., Robert H. Jackson and the Quest for Justice at
Nuremberg, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L., No. 2, 263, 271 (2003).
185

186 Robert Jackson, Chief of Counsel for the United States, Opening Statement to the
International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, 11 TRIAL OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE
THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL 99 (1947).
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the constitution, among them immunity from prosecution.”187 Later that day,
Saddam spoke with a powerful and aggressive tone. He turned to the
cameras as if he was trying to convince the Iraqi people. His voice rang across
the courtroom and rose as his passion became evident: “Those who fought in
God’s cause will be victorious . . . . I am at the mercy of God, the most
powerful.”188 When the judge persisted, Saddam demanded, “Who are you?
What does this court want?”189 Saddam Hussein al-Tikriti, deposed President
of Iraq, added: “I don’t answer to this so-called court, with all due respect,
and I reserve my constitutional rights as the president of the country of Iraq.
I don’t acknowledge either the entity that authorizes you, nor [sic] the
aggression, because everything based on a falsehood is a falsehood.”190
Over time, the power of the people’s will trumped the dictator’s power.
Saddam and the other leading Ba’athists were subjected to criminal
prosecutions because the democratically-elected representatives of the people
enacted legislation to remove that immunity.191 This revocation of immunity
stands for the principle that personal immunity flowing from the official
position of an accused is property of the state and cannot be perverted into an
irrevocable license to commit the most serious crimes known to mankind. Not
only does a sovereign state have the right to revoke immunity flowing from
constitution or statute, the Dujail Cassation Decision even postulates that:
[I]t is the duty of the state to exercise its criminal jurisdiction
against those responsible for committing international crimes
since the crimes of which the defendants are accused of in the
Dujail case form both international and domestic crimes and
committing them constitutes a violation of the International
Penal Code and the Law of Human Rights while at the same
time violating Iraqi laws.192
187 See Judge Delays Saddam Trial Until November, PBS ONLINE NEWSHOUR, Oct. 19, 2005,
http:www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/saddam_10-19-05.html.

See Martin Asser, Opening Salvoes of Saddam Trial, BBC NEWS, Oct. 19, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/4356754.stm.

188

189

Id.

190

Id.

Echoing the tenets of modern international criminal law embodied in Article 27 of the Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court, the Iraqis revoked the immunity of former Ba’athist
officials. Statute of the Iraqi High Criminal Court, supra note 17, at art. 15. The Rome Statute
provides:
191

The official position of any accused person, whether as president, chairman or
a member of the Revolution Command Council, prime minister, member of
the counsel of ministers, a member of the Ba’ath Party Command, shall not
relieve such person of criminal penal, nor mitigate punishment. No person is
entitled to any immunity with respect to any of the crimes stipulated in
Articles 11, 12, 13, and 14 of this law.
Id.
192

Cassation Panel, Iraqi High Criminal Court, al-Dujail Final Opinion, supra note 7, at 18.
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Furthermore, in perhaps the clearest jurisprudential statement
regarding the specific liability attaching to a head of state found guilty of
serious breaches of international humanitarian law, the Cassation Panel
wrote that crimes committed while subject to a grant of immunity should be
subject to more severe punishment. This principle is worthy of emulation in
other tribunals as other nations strive to apply the substantive content of
international law, and may over time represent the single most important
legal concept to come out of the al-Dujail verdicts. The cloak of official
immunity is a factor for aggravating the sentence because in the words of the
Iraqi jurists:
[A] person who enjoys it usually exercises power which
enables him to affect a large number of people, which
intensifies the damages and losses resulting from
commitment of crimes. The president of the state has
international responsibility for the crimes he commits against
the international community since it is not logical and just to
punish subordinates who execute illegal orders issued by the
president and his aides, and to excuse the president who
ordered and schemed for commitment of those crimes.
Therefore, he is considered the leader of a gang and not the
president of a state which respects the law, and therefore, the
head chief is responsible for crimes committed by his
subordinates, not only because he is aware of those crimes,
but also for his failure to gain that awareness.193
Paraphrasing Justice Jackson’s assessment of the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg, “no history” of the era of Iraq under Ba’athist rule
will be “entitled to authority” 194 if it ignores the factual and legal conclusions
engendered by the work of the Iraqi High Criminal Court. The people who
suffered at the hands of the regime are empowered to watch as justice is done
in accordance with law and procedure. The importance of the process is
captured in the reality of what happens inside the courtroom and what is
captured in the written legacy of the judges rather than what is transmitted
for seconds that day in the broadcast media. One eminent scholar noted that
the failures of the al-Dujail trial “actually had very little to do with what
occurred inside the courtroom. The most fundamental component of a fair,
independent, and impartial trial is the absence of government

193

Id. at 9–10.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT BY MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, Oct. 7, 1946, quoted in 49 AM. J. INT’L L.
44, 49 (1955), reprinted in REPORT OF ROBERT H. JACKSON UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO
THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MILITARY TRIBUNALS 11, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
PUBLICATION 3080, WASHINGTON D.C. 432, 438 (1949) Justice Jackson also wrote that, “We have
documented from German sources the Nazi aggressions, persecutions, and atrocities with such
authenticity and in such detail that there can be no responsible denial of these crimes in the
future and no tradition of martyrdom of the Nazi leaders can arise among informed people.” Id.
194
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interference.”195 To date, the work of the court has been tainted by the
insidious effects of external politics. So long as it functions as a neutral,
independent, and apolitical servant of the people’s interests in upholding
legal precepts, the work of the High Criminal Court remains emblematic as a
modern chapter in the age old struggle to implement law as a constraining
and constructive force in society. While its operation has been pockmarked
with tragedy and occasional mistakes, it is one of the bulwarks that even
today guards against the tide of lawlessness and power sweeping across Iraq.
The struggle against impunity and unconstrained evil is a common bond
that crosses cultural and religious boundaries to unite humans. Societies and
nations have endured almost unspeakable suffering over the past century. In
the words of the Iraqi judges, humanity shares a common heritage that
cannot be torn apart because
millions of women, men and children have fallen victims
during the last century to unimaginable horrors which have
strongly shaken the human conscience; and whereas these
serious crimes threaten the peace, security and prosperity of
the world and arouse the concern of the entire international
community and must not be allowed to pass without
punishment and prosecuting their perpetrators in an effective
way through measures taken at the national level that aim to
put an end to letting the perpetrators get away with these
crimes.196
That is the legacy of al-Dujail.

195 Mark S. Ellis, The Saddam Trial: Challenges to Meeting International Standards of Fairness
with Regard to the Defense, 39 CASE W RES. J. INT’L L., 171, 192 (2006).
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